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ARTICLES
“REASONABLE” POLICE MISTAKES:
FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS AND THE
“GOOD FAITH” EXCEPTION AFTER HEIEN
KAREN MCDONALD HENNING†
INTRODUCTION
Law enforcement officers will make mistakes: mistakes in
judgment, mistakes in fact, and mistakes of law. Officers are
frequently asked to make split second decisions, and sometimes
those decisions are wrong.1 Yet, because these decisions are
necessary, the United States Supreme Court has recognized that
police mistakes are inevitable and, to varying degrees, tolerated.
First, the Fourth Amendment itself permits police officers to
make mistakes and still satisfy the substantive demands of the
Amendment.2 Second, even when officers violate the Fourth
Amendment, the Court has ruled that the violation may not have
a civil remedy. When individuals bring suits for violations of
their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the doctrine of
qualified immunity shields police officers from liability when
their conduct does not violate a clearly established constitutional
right.3 Lastly, a criminal defendant is not able to obtain
†
Associate Professor of Law, University of Detroit Mercy School of Law. Many
thanks to Dean Phyllis L. Crocker for her thoughtful suggestions on this article and
to Nadia Maraachli for her tremendous support as a research assistant. Thank you
as well the editorial staff of the St. John’s Law Review for their assistance with this
article, and in particular, thank you to Stephen DiMaria, Anna Menkova, Jacqueline
Wild, Thomas Rossidis, and Kaitlin Decker.
1
The consequences of these wrong judgments range from inconveniences to
tragedies, such as the Cleveland police officer who killed a twelve-year-old boy who
had a toy gun in a park in November 2014. See Emma G. Fizsimmons, 12 Year Old
Boy Dies After Police in Cleveland Shoot Him, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2014),
www.nytimes.com/2014/11/24/us/boy-12-dies-after-being-shot-by-cleveland-policeofficer.html).
2
Maryland v. Garrison, 480 U.S. 79 (1987).
3
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
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suppression of evidence illegally seized if the “good faith”
exception to the exclusionary rule applies.4
In all three
situations, the Court calls for a determination of whether the
mistake made by the officer was one that can be called
“objectively reasonable.”5 Yet, what the Court means by the term
objectively reasonable varies, and this variance sows confusion.
The confusion over what constitutes an objectively
reasonable mistake has become more pronounced with the
Court’s decision in Heien v. North Carolina.6 Until this decision,
the lower federal courts—save the United States Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit—had refused to extend the Fourth
Amendment’s tolerance of mistakes to police errors about
statutory proscriptions in their jurisdiction.7 Thus, where police
officers’ actions were based on mistakes regarding the
substantive law in their jurisdiction, the federal courts had
concluded that the police officer’s conduct was not consistent with
the demands of the Fourth Amendment.8 Moreover, the federal
courts had refused to extend the good faith exception to such
mistakes of law.9

4

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984).
Garrison, 480 U.S. at 88; Leon, 468 U.S. at 926; Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
6
135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
7
See United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006); United
States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d 1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003); United States v. King, 244
F.3d 736, 741 (9th Cir. 2001); United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir.
1998). But see United States v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005) (citing
United States v. Smart, 393 F.3d 767, 770 (8th Cir. 2005)) (“[T]he validity of a stop
depends on whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in the
circumstances, and in mistake cases the question is simply whether the mistake,
whether of law or fact, was an objectively reasonable one.”).
8
Indeed, one of the foremost authorities on Fourth Amendment law, Professor
Wayne LaFave, wrote in 2004 that “it is well-established Fourth Amendment
doctrine that the sufficiency of the claimed probable cause must be determined by
considering the conduct and circumstances deemed relevant within the context of
the actual meaning of the applicable substantive provision, rather than the officer’s
claimed interpretation of that statute.” Wayne R. LaFave, The “Routine Traffic Stop”
From Start to Finish: Too Much “Routine,” Not Enough Fourth Amendment, 102
MICH. L. REV. 1843, 1847–48 (2004).
9
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279–80; United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d
1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th
Cir. 1999).
5
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In December 2014, however, the Supreme Court ruled 8–1 in
Heien v. North Carolina10 that the demands of the Fourth
Amendment can be satisfied when the officer acts based on a
mistake regarding the scope of a substantive law. Reasoning
that reasonable individuals may make mistakes of law as well as
fact, the Court concluded that when a stop is based on a police
officer’s objectively reasonable mistake of substantive law, that
stop complies with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.11
At the same time, both the majority opinion and the concurrence
were careful to distinguish the standard for determining whether
the mistake was reasonable for purposes of a Fourth Amendment
claim from what they clearly viewed as the more permissive
standard for determining whether an officer was entitled to
qualified immunity.12 Notably absent from the majority and
concurring opinions was any discussion of the relationship
between reasonable mistakes under the Fourth Amendment and
mistakes that are reasonable for purposes of the good faith
exception to the exclusionary rule.
Given Heien’s distinction between the standard under the
Fourth Amendment and the standard for qualified immunity, we
are left after Heien with the conclusion that the concept of
“objectively reasonable” conduct varies depending on the type of
claim the Court is addressing. In particular, Heien leaves open
both the question of what constitutes a reasonable mistake of law
for Fourth Amendment purposes and the question of how that
answer relates to the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule. This Article explores these questions. Part I examines how
the Court has increased its tolerance of police mistakes, both in
addressing Fourth Amendment claims and in the remedial
doctrines of qualified immunity and the good faith exception to
the exclusionary rule, and it ends with an examination of the
Heien decision. Part II reviews and evaluates the lower courts’
application of Heien from December 2014 through December
2015 on both the substantive Fourth Amendment claims and the
good faith exception. This review concludes that while many
courts are showing too much deference to police error on
substantive Fourth Amendment claims, they also are correctly
not considering the good faith exception once they conclude that
10
11
12

135 S. Ct. at 540.
Id. at 539.
Id.; id. at 540–41 (Kagan, J., concurring).
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there was an unreasonable mistake of law by the police. In
short, an unreasonable mistake of law renders the good faith
exception not applicable. Part III considers the implications of
this conclusion for the good faith exception to the exclusionary
rule and concludes that Heien—a decision that expands
toleration of police error—could also paradoxically provide a
possible limiting principle to the expansive language that the
Court has used in its most recent good faith exception cases.
I.

THE EVOLVING TOLERANCE OF POLICE MISTAKES

In carrying out their duties, police may make a variety of
mistakes. They may misapprehend the facts—for example,
mistaking the identity of an individual and arresting the wrong
person.
They may make a mistake in the reach of the
substantive prohibition—for example, thinking that the law
requires two working brake lights, when the law only requires
one light to be working. They may make a mistake as to what
the Fourth Amendment requires, such as concluding that the
search incident to arrest exception to the warrant requirement
permits warrantless searches of cellphones found on the arrestee.
As the law has evolved, the United States Supreme Court has
distinguished mistakes of fact—and now as a result of Heien,
mistakes about statutory proscriptions—from mistakes about the
dictates of the Fourth Amendment for purposes of a substantive
Fourth Amendment claim.
The Court has also distinguished whether there is a violation
of the Fourth Amendment from the question of whether there is a
remedy for that violation.
Even when there is a Fourth
Amendment violation, the violation may not result in a remedy.
When examining whether a § 1983 plaintiff is entitled to pursue
a claim against an officer, the Court essentially applies a double
reasonableness test. The plaintiff must show not only that the
conduct was objectively unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment, but that the conduct could not have been
reasonably believed to be constitutional.13 Similarly, with the
13
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (“[E]ven if a court were to hold
that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable,
warrantless search, Anderson sill operates to grant officers immunity for reasonable
mistakes as to the legality of their actions.”); see also Erwin Chemerinsky & Karen
M. Blum, Fourth Amendment Stops, Arrests and Searches in the Context of Qualified
Immunity, 25 TOURO L. REV. 781, 786 (2009) (noting that layering the qualified
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expansion of the good faith exception, the Court appears to be
developing a double reasonableness standard for purposes of the
exclusionary rule. The Court has accepted in the good faith
exception cases that there was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment, and it has gone on to evaluate whether that
mistake was objectively reasonable.14 This Part traces the
evolution of the Court’s understanding of acceptable mistakes in
Fourth Amendment law, qualified immunity, and the good faith
exception.
It ends with a description of Heien and its
understanding of the role of mistakes in evaluating Fourth
Amendment claims.
A.

The Fourth Amendment’s Accommodation of Reasonable
Mistakes

The Fourth Amendment has historically been read as
requiring the government to obtain a warrant before engaging in
a search or seizure. As the Supreme Court repeated as recently
as
last
year,
warrantless
searches
“are
per
se
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.”15
Notwithstanding this
admonition, many searches and seizures are in fact lawfully

immunity standard over the Fourth Amendment reasonableness question “gives the
officer a second, if not a third, bite at the apple, because the substantive standard
under the Fourth Amendment is very deferential towards the officer, taking into
consideration the totality of the circumstances”). A number of observers have argued
that this double reasonableness test unjustifiably expands the scope of qualified
immunity, and in so doing, limits the effectiveness of § 1983 in deterring official
misconduct and compensating victims for violations of their constitutional rights.
See, e.g., Barbara E. Armacost, Qualified Immunity: Ignorance Excused, 51 VAND. L.
REV. 583 (1998); Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J.
229 (2006); Diana Hassel, Excessive Reasonableness, 43 IND. L. REV. 117 (2009);
Pamela S. Karlan, The Paradoxical Structure of Constitutional Litigation, 75
FORDHAM L. REV. 1913 (2007).
14
See Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 240 (2011). The Court has similarly
limited the reach of Fourth Amendment law through its restrictions on the
availability of the exclusionary rule. See Sam Kamin & Justin Marceau, Double
Reasonableness and the Fourth Amendment, 68 U. MIAMI L. REV. 589, 617–18
(2014); Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Constitutional Culpability: Questioning the New
Exclusionary Rules, 66 FLA. L. REV. 623, 638 (2014); Tracey Maclin & Jennifer
Rader, No More Chipping Away: The Roberts Court Uses an Axe To Take Out the
Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 81 MISS. L. REV. 1183, 1201–10 (2012);
Justin F. Marceau, The Fourth Amendment at a Three-Way Stop, 62 ALA. L. REV.
687, 732–33 (2011).
15
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (alteration in
original) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)).
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conducted without a warrant.16 Consequently, as the Supreme
Court is fond of reminding us, “the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness.’ ”17 Thus, for example,
law enforcement officials are excused from the need to obtain a
warrant before entering a home when there is probable cause to
believe that there are exigent circumstances requiring police
action,18 and they may stop and search a vehicle when there is
probable cause to believe there is evidence of a crime in the
vehicle.19 Moreover, police may stop individuals without a
warrant under Terry v. Ohio20 when they have a reasonable
suspicion that the individual engaged in or was about to engage
in a crime, and they may also frisk the person if there is reason
to believe the individual is armed and dangerous.21
In fact, both the definition of probable cause—a “fair
probability” that a crime has been committed22—and the
definition of reasonable suspicion—“articulable facts” indicating
that a crime has been committed, but less than the evidence
necessary for probable cause23—anticipate that the police officer
may well be wrong in her assessment of the facts. Thus, in
evaluating whether a warrantless search or seizure—and the
scope of any search—was consistent with the requirements of the
Fourth Amendment, the Court has assessed the reasonableness
of the officer’s conduct in light of the information available to the
officer.24 Consequently, the Court has concluded that the Fourth
Amendment is not violated when information becomes available
after the fact that shows that the officer was mistaken about the
facts.25 Nor is the Fourth Amendment violated when there is not
support for the arrested offense, but there is probable cause for

16

Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2482 (2014) (noting that “warrantless
searches incident to arrest occur with far greater frequency than searches conducted
pursuant to a warrant”).
17
Id. (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 403 (2006)).
18
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011) (noting these exigent
circumstances include entry to protect the safety of officers or the public, entry in
hot pursuit of a fleeing felon, and entry to prevent the imminent destruction of
evidence).
19
Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 153 (1925).
20
392 U.S. 1 (1968).
21
Id. at 27–28.
22
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
23
Navarette v. California, 134 S. Ct. 1683, 1687 (2014).
24
See infra text accompanying notes 30–38.
25
See infra text accompanying notes 45–48.
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some offense that the accused could have been charged with. In
these situations, the Court has held that the reasonableness of
the officer’s conduct, viewed from an objective standard, permits
the allowance of mistakes.
The Court’s acceptance of police mistakes began in Brinegar
v. United States,26 where the Court explored the limitations
involved in the standard for probable cause.
The Court
emphasized that the probable cause standard “deal[s] with
probabilities”27 and requires that the police be given “fair leeway”
in enforcing the law.28 Thus, the Court concluded, “Because
many situations which confront officers in the course of executing
their duties are more or less ambiguous, room must be allowed
for some mistakes on their part.”29 However, the Court warned
that not all mistakes would be accepted: “[T]he mistakes must be
those of reasonable men.”30
Based on this understanding of reasonable mistakes, the
Court has held that the police complied with the reasonableness
requirement of the Fourth Amendment in several cases where
the police turned out to have been wrong in their understanding
of the facts. First, in Hill v. California,31 the Court held that the
Fourth Amendment provided the police with “fair leeway” when
the police had probable cause to arrest one person but arrested
another individual on the belief that the second person was the
first one.32 Although the Court recognized that the subjective
beliefs of the arresting officers could not justify the search and
that the officers were “quite wrong” as to the identity of the
arrestee, the Court also concluded that the officers did not violate
the Fourth Amendment because the mistake of identity was a

26

338 U.S. 160 (1949).
Id. at 175.
28
Id. at 176.
29
Id.
30
Id.
31
401 U.S. 797 (1971).
32
Id. In Hill, the police had probable cause to arrest Mr. Hill for robbery, went
to Mr. Hill’s apartment, and arrested the individual who answered the door. The
individual turned out to be a man named Miller, who matched the description given
to the police of Hill. The Court held that the arrest of Miller was supported by
probable cause, and therefore, the gun and ammunition the police found on the
living room table were not seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 799–
801.
27
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reasonable one.33
Second, the Court held in Maryland v.
Garrison34 that the Fourth Amendment provided fair leeway
when the police mistakenly searched the wrong apartment
pursuant to a warrant that was premised on the belief that there
was only one apartment on the third floor of a building.35
Finally, the Court explored the role of factual accuracy and
mistakes in Illinois v. Rodriguez,36 and it concluded that the
police may rely on a third party’s consent to enter a property
when the facts available to the police at the time of entry would
lead a reasonable police officer to believe the third party had
authority over the premises.37 In Rodriguez, the Court reiterated
that the Fourth Amendment commands “not that [officers]
always be correct, but that they always be reasonable.”38

33
Id. at 804 (explaining that “probability, not certainty, is the touchstone of
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment”).
34
480 U.S. 79 (1987).
35
Id. In Garrison, the police obtained a warrant supported by probable cause for
the apartment of the third floor of a building occupied by a man named McWebb.
They realized after they had entered an apartment and discovered drugs that there
were two apartments on the third floor and that they had entered the apartment not
authorized by the warrant. Id. at 80. The Garrison Court extended the reasoning in
Hill to conclude that “the discovery of facts demonstrating that a valid warrant was
unnecessarily broad does not retroactively invalidate the warrant.” Id. at 85. Rather,
as in Hill, the Court stated that the issue was whether the officer’s factual
misunderstanding was “objectively understandable and reasonable.” Id. at 88.
36
497 U.S. 177, 179 (1990).
37
Id. at 188. In Rodriguez, the police went to an apartment where they found a
woman who showed signs of a severe beating. Id. at 179. The woman stated that
Rodriguez had assaulted her earlier in the day. Id. She went with the police to
Rodriguez’s apartment, and she used her key to the apartment to let the police in.
Id. Once in Rodriguez’s apartment, they saw cocaine and drug paraphernalia in
plain view in the living room. Id. at 180. They moved into the bedroom where they
found Rodriguez asleep and more drugs. Id. at 179–80. Rodriguez moved to suppress
the drugs on the grounds that the woman had no authority to consent to the entry by
the police. Id. at 180. The Court agreed that the woman did not in fact have
authority to consent to the entry because she had moved out of the apartment a
month before the entry, her name was not on the lease for the apartment, and she
did not contribute to the rent. Id. at 181. Nonetheless, the Court held that the search
could be upheld if a reasonable officer would have believed that the woman had
authority to consent to the entry. Id. at 188.
38
Id. at 185 (“[W]e have not held that the Fourth Amendment requires factual
accuracy.”). In evaluating the reasonableness of the officer’s conduct, the Court
emphasized that the standard was an objective one judged from the perspective of
an officer “of reasonable caution.” Id. at 188.
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The Court’s tolerance for mistakes was expanded beyond
factual errors in Michigan v. DeFillippo39 to include situations in
which an officer had facts indicating a violation of a statute that
was later deemed to be unconstitutionally vague.40 In reaching
the conclusion that such an arrest was supported by probable
cause, the Court relied on the same distinction between the
standards required for a valid arrest and the standards for a
conviction that the Court pointed to in Brinegar.41 Because there
was no indication that the police officer should have known that
the statute was unconstitutional, the Court concluded that the
mistake—an arrest based on an unconstitutional statute—did
not necessitate the conclusion that the arrest lacked probable
cause.42 The Court rested this conclusion on the rationale that it
was not in the public interest for police officers to decide whether
to enforce a law based on the officer’s evaluation of the
constitutionality of the statute.43 Thus, the Court held that the
arrest was valid when the officer had sufficient facts to conclude
that there was probable cause to believe that the individual
violated a statute that had not been declared to be
unconstitutional, at least where the statute was not “so grossly
and flagrantly unconstitutional that any person of reasonable
prudence would be bound to see its flaws.”44
The Court has also extended the leeway provided to police
officers under the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness standard
to situations in which there is probable cause to arrest for some
offense, regardless of the actual motivations of the officers or the
offense for which the accused was actually arrested. In Whren v.
United States,45 the Court rejected the defendant’s claim that the
stop of his vehicle should be found unconstitutional because the
claimed offense was a pretext for a stop actually motivated by the
officer’s belief—unsupported by probable cause—that the driver
and passenger were engaged in illegal drug dealing.46 The Court

39

443 U.S. 31 (1979).
Id. at 39–40.
41
Id. at 36.
42
Id. at 35–36.
43
Id. at 38 (“Society would be ill-served if its police officers took it upon
themselves to determine which laws are and which are not constitutionally entitled
to enforcement.”).
44
Id.
45
517 U.S. 806 (1996).
46
Id. at 815–16, 819.
40
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found that the actual motivation of the police officer involved was
constitutionally irrelevant;47 what mattered was whether there
was probable cause based on the facts for a reasonable officer to
conclude an offense occurred.48 And, in Devenpeck v. Alford,49 the
Court extended this logic to hold that whether there was
probable cause for the arrest depends on whether the facts
known to the arresting officer provided probable cause for an
offense, regardless of the actual charge cited by the arresting
officer at the time of the arrest.50
In both Whren and Devenpeck, the Court expressly eschewed
any evaluation of the subjective intent of the police officers.51
Instead, the Court repeatedly emphasized that the
reasonableness standard required the courts to apply objective
standards of conduct.52 Inquiry into the subjective intent of the
officer involved could render arrests made under the same set of
facts vary in their consequences,53 and this result would be
contrary to the Fourth Amendment’s command that the conduct
of government officials be objectively reasonable.54 Thus, as long
47
Id. at 813 (“Subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis.”). As Professor LaFave pointed out, the analysis done
by the Court in Whren leaves much to be desired. LaFave, supra note 8, at 1859.
While it is clear that all members of the Court rejected an inquiry into the motives of
the particular officer, it is by no means clear why the subjective motivations should
be deemed irrelevant in analyzing whether a stop was reasonable. Id. at 1854–58.
Indeed, as Professor LaFave concluded, the Court’s analysis in the case in essence
“trivialize[d] what in fact is an exceedingly important issue regarding a pervasive
law-enforcement practice.” Id. at 1859.
48
Whren, 517 U.S. at 810. Moreover, in Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, a driver
was arrested and taken to jail for a misdemeanor offense that did not have the
possibility of jail time as a punishment. 532 U.S. 318, 323 (2001). The Court
concluded that the arrest was consistent with the Fourth Amendment because once
an officer has probable cause to believe an individual “has committed even a very
minor criminal offense,” that individual may be arrested as a matter of Fourth
Amendment law even if the arrest is not authorized under state law. Id. at 354.
49
543 U.S. 146 (2004).
50
Id. at 152–54.
51
See supra notes 47 and 50 and accompanying text.
52
E.g., Whren, 517 U.S. at 814 (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s concern with
‘reasonableness’ allows certain actions to be taken in certain circumstances,
whatever the subjective intent.”); Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 138 (1990)
(“[E]venhanded law enforcement is best achieved by the application of objective
standards of conduct, rather than standards that depend upon the subjective state of
mind of the officer.”); Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 176 (1949) (“[T]he
mistakes must be those of reasonable men, acting on facts leading sensibly to their
conclusions of probability.”).
53
Devenpeck, 543 U.S. at 154.
54
See Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177, 188 (1990).
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as the facts provide probable cause for an arrest for some crime
in the jurisdiction, the arrest complies with the Fourth
Amendment.
In short, the “fair leeway” that the Court first provided to
law enforcement in the Brinegar decision has evolved into a
“reasonableness” inquiry with substantial allowance for error.
Indeed, as Professors Kamin and Marceau recently noted, the
current approach to Fourth Amendment claims “tends to skew in
favor of government conduct at the expense of individual
liberty.”55 Moreover, at the same time as the Court was reading
the protections of the Fourth Amendment in a manner that
favored the government, the Court also restricted the availability
of relief both in the context of civil law suits seeking redress for
constitutional violations and in criminal prosecutions.56 Thus, as
is shown in the next section, even when the Fourth Amendment
did not tolerate police officers’ errors, the Court has shielded
many of those errors from any real consequences with two
remedial doctrines: the doctrine of qualified immunity and the
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
B.

The Evolution of Qualified Immunity and Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

In 1961, the Supreme Court issued two seminal decisions
involving the enforcement in federal constitutional rights:
Monroe v. Pape,57 which permitted victims of constitutional
violations to use 42 U.S.C. § 1983 to obtain a federal remedy in
federal courts, and Mapp v. Ohio,58 which extended the
exclusionary rule to the states. Both decisions saw remedies as
an essential part of the rights and drew from the pronouncement
in Marbury v. Madison59 that where there is a right, there is a
remedy.60 Yet, as both qualified immunity and the good faith

55

Kamin & Marceau, supra note 14, at 618.
Erwin Chemerinsky, Closing the Courthouse Doors, 90 DENVER U. L. REV.
317, 326–30 (2012); Pamela S. Karlan, The Transformation of Judicial SelfRestraint, 100 CAL. L. REV. 607, 611–13 (2012); Nancy Leong & Aaron Belzer,
Enforcing Rights, 62 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 306, 314–16 (2015).
57
365 U.S. 167 (1961).
58
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
59
5 U.S. 137 (1803).
60
Id. at 163 (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of
every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an
injury.”). As Professor Harmon explained in her article, the Monroe v. Pape and
56
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exception have evolved, the constitutional right and the remedy
for violations of those rights have been consciously decoupled.
This decoupling, in turn, has led to a situation in which
constitutional violations do not necessarily result in any
consequences for the government.
1.

The Origins of Qualified Immunity and the Good Faith
Exception to the Exclusionary Rule

From early in the modern civil rights era, the Court
recognized that the doctrine of qualified immunity was a
necessary restriction in § 1983 cases to protect societal interests
in ensuring that official decision making was not skewed by fear
of liability for any mistake.61 At the same time, the Court
recognized that inherent in the granting officials immunity was a
balance of evils between the vindication of constitutional rights
and the social costs of subjecting officials to liability.62 The Court
had originally envisioned qualified immunity as a doctrine that
protected those who either acted in good faith63 or objectively did
not or should not have known that their conduct violated a
Mapp decisions were based on the Court’s judgment that local and state
governments had failed to adequately protect individuals from police misconduct.
Rachel A. Harmon, The Problem of Policing, 110 MICH. L. REV. 761, 765 (2012). By
expanding the exclusionary rule to the states, and by permitting victims of police
overreaching to sue under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the Court, in Professor Harmon’s
opinion, “allocated wholesale the responsibility for solving the problem of policing to
courts and promoted the regulation of the police primarily by constitutional
adjudication.” Id. Even if Professor Harmon’s account is arguably overstated, there
is no doubt that she is correct in asserting that the Warren Court saw the remedies
it adopted in the Mapp and Monroe v. Pape decisions as essential for ensuring that
the constitutional rights of citizens were respected. See Pamela S. Karlan, ShoeHorning, Shell Games, and Enforcing Constitutional Rights in the Twenty-First
Century, 78 UMKC L. REV. 875, 882 (2010).
61
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 242 (1974) (“Implicit in the idea that
officials have some immunity—absolute or qualified—for their acts, is a recognition
that they may err. The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume
that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from such error than not to
decide or act at all.”).
62
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 813 (1982). The Court recognized in this
decision that “an action for damages may offer the only realistic avenue for
vindication of constitutional guarantees.” Id. at 814. At the same time, the Court
enumerated the costs to both the individual officials and “to society as a whole.” Id.
As the Court explained, “[t]hese social costs include the expenses of litigation, the
diversion of official energy from pressing public issues, and the deterrence of able
citizens from acceptance of public office,” as well as the threat to the official decisionmaking will be made with an eye toward potential liability. Id.
63
See Scheuer, 416 U.S. at 245–46.
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constitutional right.64 However, in Harlow v. Fitzgerald,65 the
Court rejected this good faith standard because it permitted
“bare allegations of malice” to force officials to participate in
litigation and face potential liability.66 In order to provide
sufficient protections for government officials, the Harlow Court
concluded that officials should be “shielded from liability for civil
damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.”67 Thus, after Harlow, in
order to avoid the bar of qualified immunity, a § 1983 plaintiff
had to make a two part showing: (1) his or her constitutional
rights were violated, and (2) the right was clearly established at
the time of the violation.68
Two years after the Court decided Harlow, the Court
recognized a good faith exception to the exclusionary rule in
United States v. Leon.69 As Professor Laurin has shown, the Leon
decision borrowed significantly from the Harlow decision and
envisioned a similar two-step process in which the finding of a
constitutional violation was separated from any remedial
consequences for that violation.70 In Leon, a search had been
conducted pursuant to a warrant that was later determined to
lack probable cause, and the question before the Court was
whether there should be an exception to the exclusionary rule to
permit the introduction of the evidence seized pursuant to the
warrant later found to be defective.71 In answering this question,
the Court began its analysis by distinguishing the issue of
whether the Fourth Amendment was violated from the question
of whether the exclusion of evidence was appropriate.72 The
Court justified this decoupling by citing the “substantial social
costs exacted by the exclusionary rule.”73 Moreover, although the
64

Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
457 U.S. 800.
66
Id. at 817–18.
67
Id. at 818.
68
See id.
69
468 U.S. 897 (1984).
70
Jennifer Laurin, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 699–704 (2011). See Maclin & Rader, supra
note 14, at 1211–14, for a similar discussion.
71
Leon, 468 U.S. at 900.
72
Id. at 906.
73
Id. at 907. Amongst these perceived social costs were the interference with
the adversary system’s truth-seeking function by excluding relevant evidence, the
65
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Court in Mapp v. Ohio74 has justified the extension of the
exclusionary rule to the states as “an essential part of both the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,”75 the Leon decision
emphasized that the exclusionary rule was simply a “judicially
created remedy” that was designed to deter illegal conduct rather
than provide a right to individuals.76 After decoupling the
exclusionary rule from the Constitution and limiting the
justification for the rule to deterrence, the Court recognized a
good faith exception to the exclusionary rule that permitted the
introduction of evidence when the police obtained evidence
pursuant to a facially valid warrant, even if it was later
determined that the warrant was not valid under Fourth
Amendment standards.77
Despite the nomenclature of a good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule, the Leon Court made clear that, as was the
case with the Harlow qualified immunity standard, the officer’s
own subjective beliefs were irrelevant for purposes of the
exception. Rather, the question to be answered was whether the
conduct of the police officer was objectively reasonable.78 The
Leon Court acknowledged that it had recently eliminated the
subjective inquiry in qualified immunity cases in its Harlow
decision.79 And, the Court explained that under the test it was
adopting in suppression cases, the “good faith inquiry is confined
to the objectively ascertainable question whether a reasonably
well trained officer would have known that the search was illegal
despite the magistrate’s authorization.”80 It is not difficult to see
how this language mirrors Harlow’s language that qualified

risk that some guilty could go free, and the fear that insistence on the application of
the exclusionary rule “may well ‘generat[e] disrespect for the law and administration
of justice.’ ” Id. at 908 (quoting Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 491 (1976)).
74
367 U.S. 643 (1961).
75
Id. at 657. The Mapp Court saw the exclusionary rule as not only deterring
police misconduct, but as promoting the integrity of the judiciary. Id. at 656, 659.
76
Leon, 468 U.S. at 906.
77
Id. at 913. On the same day that the Court issued Leon, the Court issued
another decision in which it held that the exclusionary rule did not apply to evidence
seized pursuant to a warrant when the judge had forgotten to make “clerical
corrections” to that warrant. Massachusetts v. Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 991 (1984).
78
Leon, 468 U.S. at 919 n.20 (“We emphasize that the standard of
reasonableness we adopt is an objective one.”).
79
Id. at 922 n.23.
80
Id.
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immunity does not protect an official when the “official could be
expected to know that certain conduct would violate statutory or
constitutional rights.”81
2.

The Evolution of Qualified Immunity Doctrine

As originally formulated by Harlow, the qualified immunity
“clearly established” standard placed responsibility on officials to
ascertain the limits of lawful conduct. The Court explained, “If
the law [is] clearly established, the immunity defense ordinarily
should fail, since a reasonably competent public official should
know the law governing his conduct.”82 Moreover, Harlow
acknowledged that “[t]he greater power of [high] officials . . . [the]
greater potential for a regime of lawless conduct,” and therefore,
“[d]amages actions . . . were . . . ‘an important means of
vindicating constitutional guarantees.’ ”83
Yet, Harlow also
justified its revised qualified immunity test on the perceived
negative impact of litigation and potential liability on officials
and the public.84 Thus, three years after the Harlow decision, the
Court determined that qualified immunity was a legal question
because of the need to dismiss cases as quickly as possible where
liability was not warranted.85 The following year, in Malley v.
81

Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982).
Id. at 818–19.
83
Id. at 809 (citations omitted).
84
Id.
85
See generally Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985). In this case, the Court
announced that whether there was a clearly established right was “essentially [a]
legal question” and that this question should be answered before subjecting officials
to substantial discovery. Id at 526. Yet, there was a tension in qualified immunity
cases between vindicating constitutional rights by providing a remedy to victims and
shielding officials from the negative impact of potential litigation and liability. As
Justice Blackmun wrote, § 1983 “stands for . . . the commitment of our society to be
governed by law and to protect the rights of those without power against oppression
at the hands of the powerful.” Harry A. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal
Protection of Individual Rights—Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?, 60
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 28 (1985). Thus, while the Supreme Court warned of the perils of
litigation in cases such as Mitchell v. Forsyth, there were also several cases in which
the Court equated the qualified immunity standard to the “fair warning” standard
used to evaluate whether a statute was unconstitutionally vague. In United States v.
Lanier, the Court rejected a state judge’s claim that he could not be prosecuted
under the criminal analog to § 1983 for sexually assaulting women who went to his
chambers on the ground that there had been no prosecutions for such conduct and
therefore he was not on notice that his conduct violated a clearly established right.
See generally 520 U.S. 259 (1997). The Court rejected this argument on the grounds
that “the qualified immunity test is simply the adaptation of the fair warning
standard to give officials (and, ultimately, governments) the same protection from
82
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Briggs,86 the Court reassured the police officers who were seeking
absolute immunity that the qualified immunity standard would
be sufficiently protective of their interests, explaining that “[a]s
the qualified immunity defense has evolved, it provides ample
protection to all but the plainly incompetent or those who
knowingly violate the law.”87
Between 1986 and 2011, when the Supreme Court decided
Ashcroft v. al-Kidd,88 Malley’s language of “the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law” appeared
sporadically in qualified immunity decisions.89 For example, in
Hunter v. Bryant90 and Burns v. Reed,91 the Court used the quote
to explain that the standard of qualified immunity is quite
protective of government officials.92 In addition, several dissents
used the quote to object to the majority’s decision to permit a
§ 1983 suit to move forward or to hold the government officials
liable.93 But, in the vast majority of qualified immunity cases,
the Court quoted the basic standard from Harlow that officials

civil liability and its consequences that individuals have traditionally possessed in
the face of vague criminal statutes.” Id. at 270–71. Similarly, in Hope v. Pelzer, a
case in which a state prisoner brought a § 1983 action for prison guards tying him to
a hitching post for seven hours on a hot Alabama summer day, the Court explained
that a right is clearly established when it is “obvious” that officials have “fair
warning that their conduct violated the Constitution.” 536 U.S. 730, 741 (2002).
86
475 U.S. 335 (1986).
87
Id. at 341.
88
563 U.S. 731 (2011).
89
See Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 229 (1991) (per curiam).
90
Id.
91
500 U.S. 478, 495 (1991).
92
In Burns, the Court rejected a prosecutor’s claim that he was entitled to
absolute immunity for giving police advice on the legality of hypnotizing a witness
before obtaining her statement. Id. In Hunter, the Court in a per curiam decision
held that Secret Service agents were entitled to qualified immunity for arresting an
individual for threatening the plaintiff, even if they were mistaken about whether
there was probable cause supporting the arrest. 502 U.S. at 227. As the Court
explained, the agents’ decision was “reasonable, even if mistaken.” Id. at 229. In
Saucier v. Katz, the Court cited to Malley and used the quote in a parenthetical. 533
U.S. 194, 202 (2001). Curiously, however, the parenthetical was used to support the
Court’s understanding that the purpose of the qualified immunity protection was to
assure that the official was “on notice that his conduct would be clearly unlawful.”
Id.
93
Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 566 (2004) (Kennedy, J., dissenting); Morse v.
Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 429 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part); Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 752 (2002) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting); McCleary v. Navarro, 504 U.S. 966, 967 (1992) (White, J., dissenting
from denial of petition for writ of certiorari).
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are protected by qualified immunity unless their conduct
“violate[s] clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known.”94
The Court made clear, as the qualified immunity doctrine
evolved, that qualified immunity shielded officials from liability
for legal errors as well as factual mistakes as long as these
mistakes were reasonable ones.95 As the Court noted, qualified
immunity provided a shield to officers who made “mere mistakes
in judgment, whether the mistake is one of fact or one of law.”96
Moreover, the Court made clear that the qualified immunity
standard was an objective test in which the subjective intent of
the official at issue was irrelevant.97 In fact, the Court’s general
approach to qualified immunity made a number of commentators
concerned with the approach that the Court was taking on the
grounds that it was insufficiently protective of constitutional
rights.98 Indeed, the doctrine worked to require § 1983 plaintiffs
to show that the defendant officer was “doubly unreasonable”
when the constitutional claim incorporated the concept of
reasonableness. For example, in order to defeat a claim of
qualified immunity in the context of a Fourth Amendment claim,
the plaintiff had to show not only that the officer conducted an
94
See, e.g., Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)); Hope, 536 U.S. at 739; Wilson v. Layne, 526
U.S. 603, 614 (1999).
95
Harlow, 457 U.S.at 818 (“If the law at that time was not clearly established,
an official could not reasonably be expected to anticipate subsequent legal
developments, nor could he fairly be said to ‘know’ that the law forbade conduct not
previously identified as unlawful.”).
96
Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978); see Anderson v. Creighton, 483
U.S. 635, 641 (1993) (“We have recognized that it is inevitable that law enforcement
officials will in some cases reasonably but mistakenly conclude that probable cause
is present, and we have indicated that in such cases those officials—like other
officials who act in ways they reasonably believe to be lawful—should not be held
personally liable.”); Brousseau v. Haugen, 543 U.S. 194, 198 (2004) (“Qualified
immunity shields an officer from suit when she makes a decision that, even if
constitutionally deficient, reasonably misapprehends the law governing the
circumstances she confronted.”).
97
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817–18; see also Anderson, 483 U.S. at 641 (“The relevant
question . . . is the objective (albeit fact-specific) question whether a reasonable
officer could have believed [the] warrantless search to be lawful, in light of clearly
established law and the information the searching officers possessed. Anderson’s
subjective beliefs about the search are irrelevant.”).
98
See, e.g., Armacost, supra note 13, at 624–34; Alan K. Chen, Rosy Pictures
and the Renegade Officials: The Slow Death of Monroe v. Pape, 78 UMKC L. REV.
889, 910–11 (2010); David Rudovsky, Running in Place: The Paradox of Expanding
Rights and Restricted Remedies, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 1199, 1217–26 (2005).
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unreasonable search, but that the officer’s understanding of what
was reasonable was unreasonable.99 Yet, the Court continued to
reiterate that the issue in qualified immunity cases was the basic
Harlow standard: what an objectively reasonable officer would
have concluded.100
In 2011, when the Court decided al-Kidd, however, the Court
elevated the Malley phrase to something of a rallying cry. In alKidd, the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s decision permitting
a § 1983 suit to go forward against Attorney General Ashcroft for
authorizing the use of the federal material-witness statute to
detain individuals suspected of terrorist activities.101 Because
the Court concluded that there was no Fourth Amendment
violation, it was unnecessary for the Court to reach the question
of whether the conduct violated clearly established law, and yet
the Court also examined this question.102 And, in reaching this
second question, the Court made clear that, at least on the
rhetorical level, “plainly incompetent or knowingly criminal” was
the standard for evaluating whether the official had violated
clearly established law.103 The conclusion of the decision tellingly
includes these words:
Qualified immunity gives government officials breathing room
to make reasonable but mistaken judgments about open legal
questions. When properly applied, it protects “all but the
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.”
Ashcroft deserves neither label.104
99
See Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 206 (2001) (“[E]ven if a court were to hold
that the officer violated the Fourth Amendment by conducting an unreasonable,
warrantless search, Anderson still operates to grant officers immunity for reasonable
mistakes as to the illegality of their actions.”); Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635,
659 (1987) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[T]his Court has decided to apply a double
standard of reasonableness in damages actions against federal agents who are
alleged to have violated an innocent citizen's Fourth Amendment rights. By double
standard I mean a standard that affords a law enforcement official two layers of
insulation from liability or other adverse consequence, such as suppression of
evidence.”).
100
See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
101
See generally 563 U.S. 731 (2011).
102
Id. at 740. In fact, three justices objected to reaching the Fourth Amendment
claim in light of the conclusion that there was no clearly established law informing
the Attorney General that the use of the material witness statute was unlawful. See
id. at 745–47 (Ginsburg, J., joined by Breyer and Sotomayor, concurring in the
judgment); id. at 750–51 (Sotomayor, J., joined by Ginsburg and Breyer, concurring
in the judgment).
103
Id. at 743.
104
Id. (citation omitted).
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Labeling an official “plainly incompetent” or “knowingly
criminal” seems a far cry from Harlow’s focus on requiring
officials to conform their conduct to established standards, at
least rhetorically. Since the decision in al-Kidd, the Court has
repeated this standard of “plainly incompetent or knowingly
criminal” to evaluate whether an official is entitled to the
protections of qualified immunity. In a number of cases, this
rhetoric has become part of the opening explanation as to how
qualified immunity operated.105 And perhaps not surprisingly, in
each of the cases in which the Court has used this rhetorical
flourish, the § 1983 claimant has not been able to defeat the
claim of qualified immunity.106
Moreover, the Court in
Messerschmidt instructed that where the official’s conduct is not
knowing criminal, the evaluation of whether a mistake was
“reasonable” for purposes of qualified immunity turns on whether
the mistake rendered the official “plainly incompetent.”107 In
short, rather than asking whether the official has acted in an
objectively reasonable manner,108 the Court’s rhetoric in qualified
immunity cases has taken on a cast of blameworthiness: Is the
official “knowingly criminal or plainly incompetent?”
3.

The Evolution of the Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule

Just as the Court in qualified immunity cases moved from
concerns about compensating those who suffered constitutional
wrongs to concerns subjecting officials to the negative impact of
litigation and liability, the Court in the good faith exception cases
105
See, e.g., City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774
(2015); Taylor v. Barkes, 135 S. Ct. 2042, 2044 (2015); Carroll v. Carman, 135 S. Ct.
348, 350 (2014); Stanton v. Sims, 134 S. Ct. 3, 5 (2013); Messerschmidt v. Millender,
132 S. Ct. 1235, 1244–45 (2012).
106
In fact, in Stanton v. Sims, the Court noted that because “[t]here is no
suggestion in this case that Officer Stanton knowingly violated the Constitution; the
question is whether, in light of precedent existing at the time, he was ‘plainly
incompetent.’ ” 134 S. Ct. at 5.
107
Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct. at 1249 (“The officers’ judgment that the scope of
the warrant was supported by probable cause may have been mistaken, but it was
not ‘plainly incompetent.’ ”). As Professor Bendlin noted, this shift has moved the
inquiry from whether the police acted in an objectively reasonable manner to
whether the actions were not “entirely unreasonable.” Susan Bendlin, Qualified
Immunity: Protecting “All But the Plainly Incompetent” (And Maybe Some of Them,
Too), 45 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 1023, 1045 (2011) (quoting Messerschmidt, 132 S. Ct.
at 1249)).
108
See supra text accompanying notes 78–81.

FINAL_HENNING

290

10/12/2016 8:37 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:271

shifted from viewing suppression as an intrinsic part of the
Fourth Amendment to concerns about the social costs of the
exclusionary rule. And, just as the rhetoric involved in § 1983
decisions moved from “what a reasonable officer should know” to
protection of all but the “knowingly criminal or plainly
incompetent,” the Court has moved from an exception for
evidence seized when the police conduct that at the time
appeared to be “objectively reasonable” to an inquiry into
whether there was “deliberate reckless or grossly negligent”
misconduct to justify suppression of evidence.109
As was the case with the qualified immunity decision in
Harlow, the Court in Leon placed some onus on the police to
ensure that their conduct was consistent with the demands of the
Fourth Amendment. Although the Leon Court concluded that
evidence need not be suppressed where a warrant is later
determined to be unsupported by probable cause, it also made
clear that the exception to the suppression rule was premised on
the police officer having acted with “objective good faith.”110 At
the same time, the Leon opinion did introduce a connection
between the suppression of evidence and the culpability of the
police officer involved by noting that “an assessment of the
flagrancy of the police misconduct constitutes an important step
in the calculus” of determining whether the evidence should be
suppressed.111 Leon also connected the culpability of police
officers to the exclusion of evidence in concluding the
exclusionary rule was appropriate when there was some sort of
misconduct by the police either because the magistrate was
misled in issuing the warrant or because the warrant was so
facially deficient it was not reasonable for the officer to rely on
the warrant in acting.112
109
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 238–39 (2011); Herring v. United
States, 555 U.S. 135, 145 (2009); see Jennifer E. Laurin, Messerschmidt and
Convergence in Action: A Reply to Comments on Trawling for Herring, 112 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 119, 121–22 (May 14, 2012); Maclin & Rader, supra note 14, at 1189–
91.
110
Leon, 468 U.S. at 920. Although some commentators viewed the introduction
of any exception to the exclusionary rule with some alarm, see, e.g., Albert W.
Alschuler, “Close Enough for Government Work”: The Exclusionary Rule after Leon,
1984 S. CT. REV. 309 (1984), Leon can be read as consistent with the Fourth
Amendment’s preference for warrants. See Kamin & Marceau, supra note 14, at 614.
111
Leon, 468 U.S. at 911.
112
Id. at 923. The Court made clear that there were situations in which a
finding of “objective good faith” would not be warranted, including when the officer
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A few years after Leon, in Illinois v. Krull,113 the Court held
that the good faith exception applied to evidence seized by
officers who relied on a statute that was later invalidated.114
And, in Arizona v. Evans,115 the Court extended the good faith
exception to a situation in which the police relied on a false
report of an outstanding warrant transmitted from a judicial
officer.116 Yet, by and large for many years, the good faith
exception played a limited role in Fourth Amendment cases, and
exclusion of evidence was the general rule.117 However, in the
three most recent Supreme Court decisions on the good faith
exception, Hudson v. Michigan,118 Herring v. United States,119
and Davis v. United States,120 the Court has provided
significantly more leeway for the government to use evidence
obtained in violation of the Fourth Amendment,121 just as the
Court has provided more protection for officials in the qualified
immunity arena.
knew or should have known the information in the affidavit presented to the
magistrate was false, when the magistrate had abandoned her objective role, when
the affidavit clearly lacked probable cause, and where the warrant was facially
invalid. Id. Moreover, the Court cautioned that the “objective reasonableness” of the
police would be judged collectively to prevent an officer from obtaining a warrant on
a “bare-bone[d] affidavit” and then relying on others to execute that warrant. Id.
113
480 U.S. 340 (1987).
114
Id. at 350 (alteration in original) (“To paraphrase the Court’s comment in
Leon: ‘Penalizing the officer for the [legislature’s] error, rather than his own, cannot
logically contribute to the deterrence of Fourth Amendment violations.’ ”).
115
514 U.S. 1 (1995).
116
Id. at 14–16.
117
Marceau, supra note 14, at 745 (“For decades the rule was simple: if the
Fourth Amendment was deemed violated, then exclusion was required, regardless of
officer culpability.”). As Professor Marceau explained, the exclusionary rule was seen
as an institutional remedy precluding the use of evidence against a defendant, not as
punishment or liability for the individual officer involved. Id. at 745 n.289.
118
547 U.S. 586 (2006).
119
555 U.S. 135 (2009).
120
564 U.S. 229 (2011).
121
In fact, many see this trilogy of cases as moving the good faith exception to
the point of threatening to swallow the protections of the Fourth Amendment. See
Davis, 564 U.S. at 258 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[I]f the Court means what it now
says, if it would place determinative weight upon the culpability of an individual
officer’s conduct, and if it would apply the exclusionary rule only where a Fourth
Amendment violation was ‘deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent,’ then the ‘good
faith’ exception will swallow the exclusionary rule.”); Ferguson, supra note 14, at 624
(“The Supreme Court has recently directed a sustained legal assault against the
exclusionary rule.”); Marceau, supra note 14, at 741; Maclin & Rader, supra note 14,
at 1187–89.
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In Hudson v. Michigan,122 the Court determined that
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment’s knock
and announce requirement should not be subject to the
exclusionary rule.123 The Court began its analysis of the question
with the pronouncement:
“Suppression of evidence . . . has
always been our last resort, not our first impulse.”124 Although it
acknowledged that Mapp had envisioned a much wider role for
the exclusionary rule, the Court concluded that Mapp’s approach
had already been rejected in favor of one in which evidence is
only suppressed when the deterrent benefits of the rule outweigh
the substantial social costs involved in suppressing the
evidence.125
The potential impact of this decision on the
exclusionary rule was tempered by the fact that both the
majority and the concurrence stressed the lack of a causal
connection between the failure to follow the knock and announce
procedure and the seizure of the evidence.126 According to both
the majority and concurring opinion, the seizure was caused by
the execution of a valid search warrant rather than by the
violation of the knock-and-announce procedure.127 Thus, some
commentators concluded that Hudson was limited to a more
causal connection analysis,128 a conclusion that seemed
reasonable given Justice Kennedy’s concurrence specifically
endorsing the exclusionary rule.129

122

547 U.S. 586 (2006).
Id. at 591.
124
Id.
125
Id. at 591–92. As Professors Kamin and Marceau pointed out, this statement
is one of “Orwellian revisionist history.” Kamin & Marceau, supra note 14, at 616
(pointing out the similarities in Hudson’s accounting of the Court’s approach to the
exclusionary rule to George Orwell’s commentary that “Oceania has always been at
war with Eurasia”).
126
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592; id. at 603–04 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
127
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 592–94 (majority opinion); id. at 603–04 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
128
See Albert W. Alschuler, Herring v. United States, A Minnow or a Shark?, 7
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 463, 482 (2009); Craig M. Bradley, Is the Exclusionary Rule
Dead?, 102 J. CRIM. LAW & CRIMINOLOGY 1, 4–5 (2012).
129
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 603 (“[T]he continued operation of the exclusionary rule,
as settled and defined by our precedents, is not in doubt.”).
123
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The Herring decision signaled that Hudson was not so
limited.130 In Herring, the police officer had arrested the
defendant based on inaccurate information from another police
department that the defendant had an outstanding warrant.131
Although the Court could have concluded that the police officer
was acting based on a mistake of fact, and therefore there was no
violation of the Fourth Amendment, the Court accepted that
there was a violation of the Fourth Amendment and moved
squarely to the question of whether the evidence found based on
the unlawful arrest should be invalidated.132 Herring reiterated
Hudson’s language cautioning against the use of the exclusionary
rule and using the exclusionary rule only when the deterrent
effect of excluding the evidence outweighed the social costs that
result from the exclusion of evidence.133
The Court then
expanded this cost-benefit approach to equate the culpability of
the police officer with the deterrent impact of the application of
the exclusionary rule.134 The Herring opinion drew support for
this approach from language in Leon about the “flagrancy of the
However, in Leon, the Court was
police misconduct.”135
concerned with whether the officer was acting in an objectively
reasonable manner.136 By contrast, in Herring, the Court shifted
its focus, explaining that “[t]o trigger the exclusionary rule, police
conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can
meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such
deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system.”137
Moreover, to answer what conduct might reach such a level, the

130
Whether Herring deserves the expansive reading described in this Article or
has a more minimal impact as commentators, such as Professor Alschuler, had
hoped, see Alschuler, supra note 128, at 511–13, many commentators have concluded
that Davis clearly saw Herring as evincving a pronounced antipathy toward the
exclusionary rule. See Maclin & Rader, supra note 14, at 1205–07; Kit Kinports,
Culpability, Deterrence, and the Exclusionary Rule, 21 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.
821, 830–32 (2013) [hereinafter Kinports, Culpability].
131
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 137–38 (2009).
132
Id. at 138–39.
133
Id. at 140.
134
Id. at 143.
135
Id. at 144 (quoting United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 911 (1984)).
136
Leon, 468 U.S. at 919, 922–23.
137
Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.
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Court explained it was looking for “deliberate, reckless, or grossly
negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or
systemic negligence.”138
The Court returned to this heightened rhetoric two years
later in Davis v. United States.139 In Davis, the Court was faced
with the question of how to handle a motion to suppress evidence
when the search was lawful under binding precedent at the time
of the search but was determined to be unconstitutional while
the defendant’s case was on direct appeal.140 As a general rule,
defendants may take advantage of a change in the law while
their case is pending, and that is precisely what happened to
Davis.141 Moreover, the Court recognized that as a consequence
of this general rule of retroactivity, the search of Davis violated
the Fourth Amendment; but, that did not mean that the evidence
needed to be excluded.142

138
Id. At the same time, the Court insisted that the test remained an objective
test in which the subjective intent of the official was irrelevant. Id. at 145.
Commentators have questioned how to apply a test that calls for an evaluation of
reckless conduct without any subjective inquiry. Ferguson, supra note 14, at 640–41;
Alschuler, supra note 128, at 483–88; Kit Kinports, Veteran Police Officers and
Three-Dollar Steaks: The Subjective/Objective Dimensions of Probable Cause and
Reasonable Suspicion, 12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 751, 752–53 (2010) [hereinafter
Kinsports, Reasonable Suspicion]. Moreover, as Justice Ginsburg pointed out in her
Herring dissent, the assumption of the Court that the deterrence is not effective in
cases where officers are negligent “runs counter to a foundational premise of tort
law.” Herring, 555 U.S. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). A number of commentators
have agreed with this point. See Bradley, supra note 128, at 9; Kinports, Culpability,
supra note 130, at 835–36. In fact, as Professors Kamin and Marceau recently wrote,
“It seems almost unfair at this point to critique the logic of Herring—that negligent
conduct cannot be deterred through sanctions.” Kamin & Marceau, supra note 14, at
617.
139
564 U.S. 229 (2011).
140
Id. at 237.
141
In Davis, the defendant’s car was searched based on the binding authority
that permitted a search of the passenger compartment whenever a suspect was
arrested in an automobile. In Arizona v. Gant, the Supreme Court held that if the
suspect is restrained, the search is limited to evidence related the offense for which
the suspect was arrested. 556 U.S. 332 (2009). The defendant’s case in Davis was on
direct appeal when Gant was decided, and thus, under ordinary principles of
retroactivity, the defendant was entitled to apply Gant to his search. Davis, 564 U.S.
at 252–53 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
142
While the Court acknowledged that the retroactivity principle required the
conclusion that the search violated Davis’s Fourth Amendment rights, it concluded
that the evidence should not be suppressed because the “[r]etroactive application
does not . . . determine what ‘appropriate remedy’ (if any) the defendant should
obtain.” Davis, 564 U.S. at 241–43 (majority opinion).
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The Davis Court continued its singular focus on deterrence
as the only justification for the exclusionary rule;143 yet, it also
cautioned that “[r]eal deterrent value is a ‘necessary condition for
exclusion,’ but it is not ‘a sufficient’ one.”144 Rather, because the
Court saw the “heavy toll” that the exclusionary rule plays on
“both the judicial system and society at large,” the Court
instructed that the “deterrence benefits of suppression must
outweigh its heavy costs.”145 As it did in Herring, the Davis
Court equated the deterrence value of suppression with the
culpability of the police officer.146 The Court explained: “[W]hen
the police act with an objectively ‘reasonable good faith belief’
that their conduct is lawful, or when their conduct involves only
simple, ‘isolated’ negligence, the ‘ “deterrence rationale loses
much of its force,” ’ and exclusion cannot ‘pay its way.’ ”147

143
Id. at 236–237. Some members of the Court have refused to view the
exclusionary rule as solely concerned about deterrence. As Justice Sotomayor
recently wrote in her powerful dissent in Utah v. Strieff, the exclusionary rule not
only deters police misconduct, “[i]t also keeps courts from being ‘made party to
lawless invasions of the constitutional rights of citizens by permitting unhindered
governmental use of the fruits of such invasions.” 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2065 (2016)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 13 (1968)). See
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 152 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 357 (1974)
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the exclusionary rule “also serves other
important purposes: It ‘enabl[es] the judiciary to avoid the taint of partnership in
official lawlessness,’ and it ‘assur[es] the people—all potential victims of unlawful
government conduct—that the government would not profit from its lawless
behavior, thus minimizing the risk of seriously undermining popular trust in
government’ ”)).
144
Id. at 237 (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006)). According
to the Davis opinion, “Our cases hold that society must swallow this bitter pill when
necessary, but only as a ‘last resort.’ ” Id. (quoting Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S.
586, 591 (2006)). In the most recent Term, the Court reiterated its distaste for the
exclusionary rule in a case involving the attenuation doctrine, a doctrine that
permits fruits of unconstitutional police conduct to be admitted when the connection
between the constitutional violation and the evidence is severed by an intervening
event. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at 2061. The majority began its discussion by quoting
Hudson’s conclusion that “[s]uppression of evidence . . . has always been our last
resort, not our first impulse.” Id. (quoting Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591).
145
Davis, 564 U.S. at 237.
146
Id. at 238 (explaining that the culpability required was “ ‘deliberate,’
‘reckless,’ or ‘grossly negligent’ disregard for Fourth Amendment rights”) (quoting
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009)).
147
Davis, 564 U.S. at 238 (citations omitted).
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The Connection Between the Qualified Immunity Standard
and the Good Faith Exception

In both the qualified immunity cases and the good faith
exception cases, we see an escalation of rhetoric that favors the
government as opposed to the victim of the constitutional
violation. Both standards began as a reasonable, good faith
belief standard, measured through an objective lens as to what a
reasonable officer would conclude under the circumstances.148
And, both standards began with placing the onus on the officer to
ensure that the conduct was consistent with the commands of the
Fourth Amendment. Just as the culpability required to defeat a
claim of qualified immunity escalated to a showing that the
official was “knowingly criminal or plainly incompetent,” the
Court has announced that more than “simple, isolated
negligence” must be found to exclude evidence—“deliberate,
reckless, or grossly negligent conduct” is required, at least where
the actors involved in the constitutional error are not the
investigators themselves. Thus, both doctrines call for an
objective evaluation of the facts, while simultaneously
establishing a threshold of recklessness or worse, which typically
involves an inquiry into a subjective state of mind.149
Whether the two doctrines are in fact the same has been the
subject of debate.150 While the two doctrines have developed
largely independently of each other, both the qualified immunity
doctrine and the good faith exception permit the government to
violate the Fourth Amendment without providing the victim with
a remedy. Both doctrines employ the similar language of
“reasonable mistakes” and require a degree of culpability by law
enforcement.151 And, indeed, it is clear that the standards are
148
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982); United States v. Leon, 468
U.S. 897, 919 n.20 (1984).
149
Laurin, supra note 70, at 727–28.
150
In her article, Trawling for Herring: Lessons in Doctrinal Borrowing and
Convergence, Professor Laurin suggests that Herring’s approach to the exclusionary
rule can be best understood in terms of the development of the qualified immunity
doctrine. Id. at 720. Professor John M. Greabe disagreed with Professor Laurin in
his response to this article, and in particular, her assessment of the qualified
immunity doctrine. See John M. Greabe, Objecting at the Altar: Why the Herring
Good Faith Principle and the Harlow Qualified Immunity Doctrine Should Not Be
Married, 112 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 1, 2–3 (2012).
151
Although Professors Laurin and Greabe disagree about the contours of these
two doctrines, they do agree that these doctrines share this common ground. Laurin,
supra note 70, at 727–28; Greabe, supra note 150, at 5.
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equivalents when the police conduct a search pursuant to a
defective warrant.152
Given the overlap between the two
doctrines, it seems reasonable to conclude that the two standards
are rough equivalents.153 Whether this conclusion is accurate,
however, is open to reconsideration in light of the Court’s 2014
decision in Heien v. North Carolina,154 when the Court
incorporated “objectively reasonable” mistakes of law into the
concept of reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.155
C.

The Heien Decision

Notwithstanding the substantial leeway the Supreme Court
provided to officers under the reasonableness standard of the
Fourth Amendment, the federal circuits—save the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit—refused to find that
arrests based on a mistaken understanding of substantive law
were consistent with the commands of the Fourth Amendment.
Rather, the majority of lower federal courts concluded that
warrantless searches or seizures based on police mistakes
regarding substantive law were “objectively unreasonable.”156 In
152

Although Justice White indicated in Leon that there might be some
differences between the two standards, Leon, 468 U.S. at 922 n.23, in Malley v.
Briggs (a qualified immunity case), Justice White wrote: “[T]he same standard of
objective reasonableness that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in
Leon defines the qualified immunity accorded an officer whose request for a warrant
allegedly caused an unconstitutional arrest.” 475 U.S. 335, 344 (1986). And, the
Court reiterated this position in both the Groh v. Ramirez, 540 U.S. 551, 563–65
(2004) and Messerschmidt v. Millender decisions. The Messerschmidt Court
explained that “we have held that ‘the same standard of objective reasonableness
that we applied in the context of a suppression hearing in Leon defines the qualified
immunity accorded an officer’ who obtained or relied on an allegedly invalid
warrant.” Messerschmidt v. Millender, 132 S. Ct. 1235, 1245 n.1 (2012) (citations
omitted).
153
Laurin, supra note 70, at 710–11; see Orin S. Kerr, Good Faith, New Law,
and the Scope of the Exclusionary Rule, 99 GEO. L.J. 1077, 1109 (2011) (alteration in
original) (“As the Supreme Court has made clear, the traditional standard of the
good faith exception evaluates the second question by using a familiar test from
qualified immunity law. Where the good faith exception applies, it adopts ‘the same
standard of objective reasonableness that . . . defines the qualified immunity
accorded an officer’ in a civil case.”). But see Greabe, supra note 150, at 7–8
(objecting to Professor Laurin’s equation of the two doctrines as threatening to
restrict the availability of remedies for constitutional torts).
154
135 S. Ct. 530 (2014).
155
Id. at 538.
156
United States v. Nicholson, 721 F.3d 1236, 1238 (10th Cir. 2013) (“Although
an officer's mistake of fact can still justify a probable cause or reasonable suspicion
determination for a traffic stop, an officer's mistake of law cannot.”); see United
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addition, in these cases, the lower federal courts rejected the
government’s attempt to use the good faith exception to the
exclusionary rule to allow the admission of the evidence.157
The lower federal courts rejected the government’s attempt
to extend the allowance for reasonable mistakes of fact to include
reasonable mistakes of law on the grounds that law enforcement
officials had the responsibility to know the law.158 The courts
reasoned that accepting substantive mistakes of law as
consistent with Fourth Amendment requirements would remove
incentives for police to make sure they understand the
substantive law they are enforcing.159 As the Fifth Circuit
explained in one of the earliest decisions on this issue, the
Supreme Court decisions gave officers “broad leeway to conduct
searches and seizures . . . the flip side of that leeway is that the
legal justification must be objectively grounded.”160 Moreover,

States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that the Supreme Court
“provides law enforcement officers broad leeway to conduct searches and
seizures . . . [b]ut the flip side of that leeway is that the legal justification must be
objectively grounded”); United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006)
(“A stop based on a subjective belief that a law has been broken, when no violation
actually occurred, is not objectively reasonable”); United States v. Tibbetts, 396 F.3d
1132, 1138 (10th Cir. 2005) (“[F]ailure to understand the law by the very person
charged with enforcing it is not objectively reasonable.”); United States v.
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th Cir. 2003) (“[A] mistake of law cannot
provide reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify a traffic stop.”); United
States v. King, 244 F.3d 736, 739 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Even a good faith mistake of law
by an officer cannot form the basis for reasonable suspicion.”). But see United States
v. Martin, 411 F.3d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 2005) (“[T]he validity of a stop depends on
whether the officer’s actions were objectively reasonable in the circumstances, and in
mistake cases the question is simply whether the mistake, whether of law or fact,
was an objectively reasonable one.”). Indeed, one of the foremost authorities on
Fourth Amendment law, Professor Wayne LaFave, wrote in 2004 that “it is wellestablished Fourth Amendment doctrine that the sufficiency of the claimed probable
cause must be determined by considering the conduct and circumstances deemed
relevant within the context of the actual meaning of the applicable substantive
provision, rather than the officer’s claimed interpretation of that statute.” LaFave,
supra note 8, at 1847–48.
157
Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1279–80; United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d
1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); United States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th
Cir. 1999).
158
Nicholson, 721 F.3d at 1242 (“[R]equiring law enforcement personnel to know
the law they are asked to enforce comports with a basic policy of fairness”); United
States v. Orduna-Martinez, 561 F.3d, 1134, 1137 n.2 (holding that “failure to
understand the law by the very person charged with enforcing it is not objectively
reasonable”).
159
E.g., Nicholson, 721 F.3d at 1242; Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d at 1106.
160
United States v. Miller, 146 F.3d 274, 279 (5th Cir. 1998).
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the courts concluded that extending the reasonable mistake line
of cases to include mistakes of law would allow the government
to use any vagueness in a statute against a defendant,161 and it
would also violate the trope that individuals are presumed to
know the law.162 In short, under the prevailing federal court
analysis, where the facts viewed objectively did not violate any
law, an arrest or stop was deemed unconstitutional and the
evidence was suppressed.163 As the Seventh Circuit succinctly
stated, “[a] stop based on a subjective belief that a law has been
broken, when no violation actually occurred, is not objectively
reasonable.”164
In Heien, the Supreme Court soundly rejected this approach
and ruled 8–1 that just as a search or seizure is consistent with
the Fourth Amendment’s commands when the police are acting
under a reasonable mistake of fact, the Fourth Amendment is not
violated when the police are acting under a reasonable mistake
about the scope of the substantive law.165 In Heien, a police
officer stopped a car because he believed that North Carolina law
required two working brake lights, and once he stopped the car,
he received consent to search the car and discovered a bag of
cocaine.166 The intermediate state court held that the initial stop
was unlawful because the law only required one brake light to be
working, and, therefore, the stop violated the Fourth
Amendment.167 The State appealed the lower court’s ruling to its
supreme court on the grounds that the police officer’s mistake of

161

Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d at 1278–79.
Nicholson, 721 F.3d at 1242 (“If [a]s a rule . . . a defendant is presumed to
know the law, we must expect as much from law enforcement.”) (citing OrdunaMartinez, 561 F.3d at 1137 n.2).
163
It should be noted that several states beyond North Carolina aligned
themselves with the Eighth Circuit and concluded that mistakes of law could be
reasonable. State v. Wright, 791 N.W.2d 791, 799 (S.D. 2010); Andrews v. State, 658
S.E.2d 126, 128–29 (Ga. Ct. App. 2008); Moore v. State, 986 So. 2d 928, 935 (Miss.
2008); City of Wilmington v. Conner, 761 N.E.2d 663, 667 (Ohio Ct. App. 2001). For
a discussion of the approach of the Eighth Circuit and the state courts, see Wayne A.
Logan, Police Mistakes of Law, 61 EMORY L.J. 69, 79–82 (2011).
164
United States v. McDonald, 453 F.3d 958, 962 (7th Cir. 2006). As Professor
Logan pointed out, this approach was consistent with the historical approach courts
took when police officers made mistakes of law. At common law, if the police officer
had no authority under the law for his actions, then the officer was a wrongdoer and
subject to tort liability. Logan, supra note 163, at 78.
165
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 534 (2014).
166
Id.
167
State v. Heien, 714 S.E.2d 827, 829–31 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011).
162
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law was reasonable, and therefore, the stop complied with the
demands of the Fourth Amendment.168 The state court agreed,
and the Supreme Court affirmed.169
Contrary to the majority of the federal circuits, the Court
found no reason to distinguish between mistakes of fact and
mistakes of substantive law. Rather, because the standard under
the Fourth Amendment is reasonableness, and because
reasonable individuals can make reasonable mistakes of law as
well as mistakes of fact, the Court found no reason to make a
distinction between the two types of mistakes.170 In fact, the
Court rejected the Defendant-Petitioner’s argument that the
question of whether a mistake of law should result in a
suppression of the evidence is more appropriately considered in
determining whether there is a remedy for the constitutional
violation, not whether there is a constitutional violation.171
Instead, the Court concluded that where the mistake of
substantive law made by the officer is a reasonable one, there
simply is no violation of the Fourth Amendment.172 At the same
time, the majority and the concurring opinion made clear that a
mistaken judgment as to the reach of the Fourth Amendment
itself—as opposed to substantive law—would not be consistent
with the Constitution.173
In expanding the realm of mistakes permitted within the
Fourth Amendment to include mistakes of substantive law, the
Court expressly rejected the claim that this approach would
encourage the “sloppy study of the laws” on the grounds that the
mistakes that were acceptable under the Fourth Amendment
were limited to those that were “objectively reasonable.”174
168

State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d 351, 352 (N.C. 2012).
Heien came to the Court in a curious posture because North Carolina does
not recognize the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule. Heien v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 545 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting). Thus, the case squarely
presented the issue to the Supreme Court of whether a mistake of law renders a
search or seizure unreasonable for purposes of a Fourth Amendment violation.
170
Id. at 536 (“Whether the facts turn out to be not what was thought, or the
law turns out to be not what was thought, the result is the same: the facts are
outside the scope of the law. There is no reason, under the text of the Fourth
Amendment or our precedents, why this same result should be acceptable when
reached by way of a reasonable mistake of fact, but not when reached by way of a
similarly reasonable mistake of law.”).
171
Id. at 538.
172
Id. at 539–40.
173
Id. at 539; id. at 541 n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring).
174
Id. at 539–40 (majority opinion).
169
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Moreover, both the majority and concurring opinions stressed
that the Fourth Amendment’s tolerance of mistakes is not as
great as it is in the context of the qualified immunity doctrine.175
Writing for the majority, Chief Justice Roberts explained that the
question of whether the officer’s mistake of law was objectively
reasonable for purposes of the Fourth Amendment “is not as
forgiving as the one employed in the distinct context of deciding
whether an officer is entitled to qualified immunity for a
constitutional or statutory violation.”176 And, Justice Kagan
wrote separately to emphasize the distinction between mistakes
of law consistent with the Fourth Amendment and the standard
for liability under qualified immunity. As she explained, “Our
modern qualified immunity doctrine protects ‘all but the plainly
incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law,’ ”177 while
an officer will be acting in accordance with the Fourth
Amendment only when a “statute is genuinely ambiguous.”178
Moreover, Justice Kagan cited as support for this understanding
the government’s position in Heien, that situations in which
there would be a reasonable mistake of law for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment would be “exceedingly rare.”179
Heien thus allows police officers to act under a mistaken
understanding of the law in their jurisdiction and yet not violate
the Fourth Amendment. At the same time, it is clear that the
eight members of the Court who accepted this conclusion also
believed that tolerance under the Fourth Amendment for
mistakes of law is less forgiving towards mistaken judgments
than is the standard for qualified immunity.180 Thus, after Heien,
we know that what is considered an “objectively reasonable
mistake” for purposes of the merits of a Fourth Amendment
claim does not provide police officers with the leeway provided
under the qualified immunity doctrine. In short, there can be an
unreasonable mistake of law that will invalidate a stop or search,
but not necessarily result in liability for the officer in a § 1983
175

Id. at 540–41 (Kagan, J., concurring).
Id. at 539 (majority opinion).
177
Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 131 S. Ct.
2074, 2085 (2011)).
178
Id. at 541 (“If the statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the
officer’s judgment requires hard interpretive work, then the officer has made a
reasonable mistake. But if not, not.”).
179
Id. at 541.
180
Id. at 539 (majority opinion); id. at 540–42 (Kagan, J., concurring).
176
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action. But, what is not clear after the decision is what
constitutes an objectively reasonable mistake of law for purposes
of the Fourth Amendment and how that understanding should
relate to any conclusion with respect to the good faith exception
to the exclusionary rule.181 It is to those questions that this
Article now turns.
II. INTERPRETING THE HEIEN DECISION
The Heien decision appears to be a very straightforward
decision. Chief Justice Roberts adopted the following logic in
reaching the conclusion that reasonable suspicion can be based
on the mistaken apprehension of the scope of the substantive
law: (1) the standard for evaluating law enforcement’s conduct
under the Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness”; (2) “[t]o be
reasonable is not to be perfect,” and thus searches based on
mistakes of fact can be reasonable; (3) reasonable police officers
can make reasonable mistakes of law as well as reasonable
mistakes of fact; and (4) therefore, there is no reason to make a
distinction between a mistake in fact and a mistake about the
scope of a legal prohibition.182 Even assuming that this approach
makes sense,183 the decision raises two significant questions.
First, it is unclear what should count as a “reasonable mistake”
for purposes of a substantive Fourth Amendment claim. Second,
in using the same “objectively reasonable” language that the
courts also employ when discussing both the good faith exception
and the qualified immunity standard, the decision blurs the
reach of the Fourth Amendment with the reach of these two
remedial doctrines.184
181

Id. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (expressing concern that “the difference
between qualified immunity’s reasonableness standard—which the Court insists
without elaboration does not apply here—and the Court’s conception of
reasonableness in this context—which remains undefined—will prove murky in
application”).
182
Id. at 536 (majority opinion).
183
See Logan, supra note 163, at 90–109 (arguing persuasively against
permitting errors of law to be consistent with the Fourth Amendment); LaFave,
supra note 8, at 1847–48 (“[I]t is well-established Fourth Amendment doctrine that
the sufficiency of the claimed probable cause must be determined by considering the
conduct and circumstances deemed relevant within the context of the actual
meaning of the applicable substantive provision, rather than the officer’s claimed
interpretation of that statute.”).
184
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“It seems to me that the
difference between qualified immunity’s reasonableness standard—which the Court
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What Is an Objectively Reasonable Mistake of Law?

In Heien, the majority gave only broad guidance as to how
the lower courts should evaluate whether a mistake of law was
“reasonable.” Writing for the majority, the Chief Justice simply
noted that the mistake must be “objectively reasonable,” that the
courts should not consider the subjective understanding of the
officer, and that the Fourth Amendment inquiry was not as
forgiving as the qualified immunity inquiry.185 The concurrence
written by Justice Kagan contains a bit more guidance, stating
that a reasonable mistake of law is only one in which “the statute
is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer’s
judgment requires hard interpretive work.”186 Justice Kagan also
wrote that she expected that such cases will be “exceedingly
rare.”187 However, the lower court decisions rendered since Heien
appear to support Justice Sotomayor’s concern that the decision
did not provide sufficient guidance as to what was a reasonable
mistake of law.188 Indeed, in the twelve months after Heien, the
lower courts have issued conflicting opinions on what constitutes
a reasonable mistake of law, with many decisions providing the
police with a great deal of leeway in making mistakes in reading
of state substantive law.
The Heien Court had little problem concluding that the
mistake of law made by the officer—stopping a car for only
having one working brake light—was a reasonable one. The
appellate court in North Carolina had concluded that this stop
was invalid because a North Carolina statute referring to a “stop
lamp” meant that only one working brake light was required.189
However, another provision of the statute required that vehicles
have “all originally equipped rear lamps or the equivalent in good

insists without elaboration does not apply here—and the Court’s conception of
reasonableness in this context—which remains undefined—will prove murky in
application.”).
185
Id. at 539 (majority opinion).
186
Id. at 541 (Kagan, J., concurring).
187
Id.
188
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 547 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“I fear the Court’s
unwillingness to sketch a fuller view of what makes a mistake of law reasonable
only presages the likely difficulty that courts will have applying the Court’s decision
in this case.”).
189
State v. Heien, 714 S.E.2d 827, 829–31 (N.C. Ct. App. 2011). The North
Carolina Supreme Court accepted this reading of the law. State v. Heien, 737 S.E.2d
351, 354 (N.C. 2012).

FINAL_HENNING

304

10/12/2016 8:37 AM

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90:271

working order.”190
In addition, there were no state court
decisions interpreting the stop-lamp provision, and both the
majority and dissent in the North Carolina Supreme Court
decision acknowledged that it would have been reasonable to
conclude that the law required vehicles to have two working
brake lights.191 Thus, given the conflict in the wording of the
statutory provisions and the lack of precedent, the United States
Supreme Court quickly concluded it was “objectively reasonable”
for the officer to believe two brake lights were required.192
Some of the decisions that have been rendered since Heien
appear to take the admonition that the mistake must be
“objectively reasonable” as a real restriction on law enforcement.
For example, in United States v. Alvarado-Zarza,193 the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the arresting officer committed an
unreasonable mistake of law, and thus violated the Fourth
Amendment in stopping a vehicle for failure to use a signal to
change lanes when the Texas statute required signals only when
making a left or right turn.194 The Fifth Circuit rested this
conclusion both on the plain language of the statute and the case
law that predated the stop, which drew a distinction between
turns and lane changes.195 Similarly, the Seventh Circuit found a
stop unreasonable when the police officer claimed he believed
that the use of a commercially sold license plate frame violated a
state statute requiring license plates to be clearly legible.196
Finally, two federal district courts have held that stops were not

190

Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 540 (quoting N.C GEN. STAT. ANN. § 20-129(d) (West

2015)).
191

Id.
Id.
193
782 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2015).
194
Id. at 251.
195
Id. at 250. See generally People v. Jones, B255728, 2015 WL 1873269 (Cal.
Ct. App. April 23, 2015) (stopping individual for walking in the middle of the road in
a residential area not reasonable mistake when both statutory language and
precedent make clear that statutory prohibition applied in commercial areas, not
residential ones); State v. Brown, 870 N.W.2d 687 (Iowa Ct. App. 2015) (finding that
the police error of arresting someone who had an open container in a car in a private
parking lot was not reasonable because both the statute and case law established
the open container law applied only to cars on public streets or highways); State v.
Scriven, No. A-5680-13T3, 2015 WL 773824 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Jan. 12, 2015)
(stopping vehicle for having high beams on was an unreasonable mistake when plain
language of statute required dimming of high beams only when facing oncoming
traffic and officer who stopped driver was in a parked vehicle).
196
United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645, 649–50 (7th Cir. 2015).
192
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reasonable mistakes of law under Heien when the officers based
the stops on the individuals having air fresheners hanging from
their rearview mirrors and claimed that those air fresheners
could be violations of ordinances preventing windshields being
obstructed.197
Yet, other decisions have provided officers with considerably
more leeway to misunderstand the law and remain compliant
with the commands of the Fourth Amendment. Several courts
have read Heien as instructing the courts to read any ambiguities
in a statute as favoring the government.198 Indeed, one court
stated that it was “skeptical” that the officer’s reading of the
statute was correct, but nonetheless concluded that under Heien
the officer’s mistake was reasonable, and, hence, there was no
Fourth Amendment violation in stopping the vehicle.199

197

United States v. Black, 104 F. Supp. 3d 997 (W.D. Mo. 2015); United States
v. Sanders, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1274 (D. Nev. 2015). A number of state courts have also
required the State to bear the burden of showing that the mistake was objectively
reasonable. See Darringer v. State, 46 N.E.3d 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (when the
legislature had changed statute a year earlier, the police officer’s lack of knowledge
of the change was not objectively reasonable); State v. Nelson, 356 P.3d 1113 (Okla.
Crim. App. 2015) (concluding that the State failed to present evidence that the
mistake of law was reasonable); State v. Lerdahl, No. 2014AP2119–CR, 2015 WL
4619946, at *3 (Wis. Ct. App. Aug. 4, 2015) (relying on Justice Kagan’s language
that “objectively reasonable mistakes of law are ‘exceedingly rare’ ” and concluded
the mistake was unreasonable); Brown, 870 N.W.2d 687 (finding that the police
error is arresting someone who had an open container in a car in a private parking
lot was not reasonable because both the statute and case law established the open
container law applied only to cars on public streets or highways); Jones, 2015 WL
1873269 (stopping an individual for walking in the middle of the road in a
residential area was not a reasonable mistake when both statutory language and
precedent make clear that the statutory prohibition applied in commercial areas, not
residential ones); State v. Tercero, 467 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. Ct. App. 2015) (reading the
statute to permit the warrantless withdrawal of blood was not reasonable).
198
United States v. Flaven, No. 3:13–cr–00104–RCJ–VPC, 2015 WL 2219779, at
*2 (D. Nev. May 12, 2015) (“Although the ambiguity in the statute might favor
Defendant in the context of a citation for an illegal lane change due to the rule of
lenity, the ambiguity favors the Government in the context of a Fourth Amendment
challenge.”); United States v. Stanbridge, 3:14–cr–30020, 2015 WL 682779, at *4
(C.D. Ill. Feb. 18, 2015) (concluding that the ambiguity in the reading of the statute
“must be resolved in the Government’s favor”); Williams v. State, 28 N.E.3d 293, 295
(Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (finding mistake of law a reasonable one when “[a] reasonable
person unversed in statutory interpretation” would likely read statute as officer did);
State v. Wilson, No. 111263, 2015 WL 326662, at *4 (Kan. Ct. App. Jan. 16, 2015)
(finding mistake of law reasonable even though as dissent points out, the statute
permitted the defendant’s conduct).
199
United States v Morales, 115 F. Supp. 3d 1291, 1295 (D. Kan. 2015); see also
United States v. Henry, CRIMINAL NO. 15-26-JWD-SCR, 2015 WL 6479029, at *3
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Moreover, even where courts have concluded that the plain
language of the statute required the conclusion that the
defendant did not violate the law, they have been willing to
conclude that the mistake was nonetheless an “objectively
reasonable” mistake.200
Perhaps most disconcerting are decisions finding no Fourth
Amendment violation when officers justify the stop by pointing to
alleged violations of traffic laws when the defendant is using
items in the manner that the general public does. For example,
contrary to the conclusions of two federal district courts,201 the
Wisconsin Supreme Court recently concluded that the Fourth
Amendment was not violated when an officer stopped a vehicle
because it had an air freshener hanging from its rearview
mirror.202 The Wisconsin court, citing the “tremendous number”
of statutory provisions governing roadway safety, concluded that
the officer’s understanding that a hanging air freshener could
violate the State’s unobstructed windshield requirement was an
“objectively reasonable mistake of law.”203 And, it reached this
conclusion even though it recognized that under the construction
of the statute that the State was proffering, the statute would
also ban oil change stickers, rosaries, and even rearview
mirrors.204 Other state courts have also found that stops based
on air fresheners and parking tags hanging from rear-view
mirrors were reasonable mistakes under Heien because an officer
could believe these hanging items violated the unobstructed
windshield requirement.205 Indeed, in one case from New York,

(M.D. La. Oct. 27, 2015) (finding no Fourth Amendment violation when police
impression was not false and unreasonable).
200
People v. Campuzano, 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 587, 591–92 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super.
Ct. 2015) (concluding both that the ordinance is “clear and unambiguous” and that
the mistake of law was “objectively reasonable”); State v. Hurley, 117 A.3d 433, 441
(Vt. 2015) (even though plain language supports the conclusion that there was no
violation, mistake by officer is reasonable); Williams, 28 N.E.3d at 295 (concluding
that although the language of the statute supported the defendant, the officer’s
mistake was reasonable because a “reasonable person unversed in statutory
interpretation would very likely read” the section as the officer did).
201
Black, 104 F. Supp. 3d at 1004–05; Sanders, 95 F. Supp. 3d at 1286.
202
State v. Houghton, 868 N.W.2d 143, 160 (Wis. 2015).
203
Id. at 155.
204
Id. at 156.
205
See Mason v. Commonwealth, 767 S.E.2d 726 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (finding
stop based on parking tag objectively reasonable); see also Hurley, 117 A.3d 433
(finding stop based on air freshener was reasonable mistake of law); People v.
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the court found the stop to be a reasonable mistake under Heien
even though, as the dissent pointed out, the police permitted the
defendant’s girlfriend to drive away from the police precinct with
the object dangling from the rearview mirror.206
Some courts have applied a similarly forgiving approach
with respect to stops based on statutes requiring license plates to
be visible.207 For example, the Illinois Supreme Court concluded
that a traffic stop based on a concern that a trailer hitch violated
a statute involving the visibility of a license plate because the
officer’s mistake of law was objectively reasonable.208 As in the
Wisconsin case, the Illinois Supreme Court recognized that
adopting the officer’s view of the law would make “a substantial
amount of otherwise lawful conduct illegal,” including not only
the use of trailer hitches, but also wheelchair and scooter carriers
relied upon by those who are physically disabled.209 Nonetheless,
because there was no prior case law addressing the use of trailer
hitches, the Illinois court concluded that the officer’s actions were
based on an objectively reasonable mistake of law.210
Many decisions issued after Heien thus show an increased
tolerance of police stops of individuals based on asserted
mistaken views of the law. What was presented to the Supreme
Court as an allowance for misunderstandings in those
“exceedingly rare” cases where there is a “ ‘counterintuitive and
confusing’ law,”211 has become in the view of many courts an
Bookman, 131 A.D.3d 1258 (N.Y. App. Div. 2015) (same); Freeman v.
Commonwealth, 778 S.E.2d 519 (Va. Ct. App. 2015) (same).
206
Bookman, 131 A.D.3d at 1262 (Austin, J., dissenting).
207
See United States v. Henry, CRIMINAL NO. 15-26-JWD-SCR, 2015 WL
6479029, at *3 (M.D. La. Oct. 27, 2015); McCabe v. Gonzales, No. 1:13-cv-00435CWD, 2015 WL 5679735, at *1 (D. Idaho Sept. 25, 2015); United States v.
McCullough, Criminal No. 3:15cr115–MHT (WO), 2015 WL 5013910, at *5 (M.D.
Ala. Aug. 17, 2015); People v. Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d 641, 653–54 (Ill. 2015); see also
State v. Crudo, No. 112,805, 2015 WL 7162274, at *13 (Kan. Ct. App. Nov. 13, 2015)
(rejecting the defendant’s claim that the license plate light was installed by the
manufacturer and therefore could not reasonably be a statutory violation). The
Kansas court went so far as to call the fact that the equipment was installed by the
vehicle manufacturer “irrelevant” and reversed the trial court’s suppression order
with instructions that a new judge be appointed to hear the defendant’s motion on
remand. Id.
208
Gaytan, 32 N.E.3d at 651.
209
Id. at 650.
210
Id. at 652–53.
211
Brief for Respondent, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13604), 2014 WL 3660500, at *17; Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Heien v. North
Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530 (2014) (No. 13-604) (agreeing that to constitute an excuse
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excuse that allows for any alleged ambiguity to be read in favor
of the police officer’s actions.
This approach reflects a
misunderstanding of what Heien meant in concluding that a
reasonable mistake of law could form the basis of a permissible
seizure under the Fourth Amendment. Indeed, the lenient
approach ignores the distinction that the Court drew in Heien
between the margin of error it was permitting police officers
under the Fourth Amendment and the margin of error permitted
in qualified immunity cases.212 The qualified immunity standard
“gives government officials breathing room to make reasonable
but mistaken judgments” by requiring the plaintiff to show that
the asserted right was “sufficiently definite that any reasonable
official . . . would have understood that he was violating it.”213 By
permitting the State to justify a seizure under the Fourth
Amendment by raising any statutory construction argument in
favor of the officer’s alleged view of the law, even when
“skeptical” of the government’s argument, these courts are
essentially applying the same lenient standard given to officials
in qualified immunity cases to the substantive Fourth
Amendment question.
But, more problematic, giving such leniency for any asserted
understanding of the law is contrary to the substantive
commands of the Fourth Amendment. As the Court reminded us
in
June
2015,
warrantless
searches
“are
per
se
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established
and well-delineated exceptions.”214 Thus, it is the government’s
burden to justify any warrantless action. Yet, the Court has also
given the police great latitude in stopping individuals and
based on a reasonable mistake of law, it must be “exceedingly rare,” “objective,” and
“a reasonable lawyer would think that the policeman was right on the law, and only
if after . . . a careful scrutiny and serious difficulty in construing the law, does it turn
out that he is wrong”).
212
Admittedly, the distinction between the two doctrines that the Court relied
on is less than clear, as Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her dissent. Heien, 135 S.
Ct. at 547 (noting that “the difference between qualified immunity’s reasonableness
standard—which the Court insists without elaboration does not apply here—and the
Court’s conception of reasonableness in this context—which remains undefined—will
prove murky in application.”). But, taking the Court at its word, it clearly intended a
more stringent test for mistakes of law and substantive Fourth Amendment claims
as required in the qualified immunity context.
213
City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1774 (2015)
(quoting Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731, 741 (2011)).
214
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015) (alteration in
original) (quoting Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 338 (2009)).
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vehicles without warrants.215 Given the significant degree of
latitude these rulings provide to law enforcement,216 the
suggestion of some courts that any asserted ambiguity in the law
be read to provide a constitutional basis for a seizure should be
rejected as shifting the traditional burden in Fourth Amendment
cases from the government to the defendant.
Bear in mind that a police officer’s subjective
misunderstanding of the law will not affect the constitutionality
of a seizure as long as a review of the facts available to the officer
establishes a basis for a finding of some violation of the law.217
Moreover, as long as there is an objectively reasonable belief that
some offense was committed, it does not matter that the officer
was using the alleged offense as a pretext for pursuing a
hunch,218 that the officer arrested and jailed an individual for a
minor offense that is only punishable by fine,219 or that state law
prohibited an arrest for the crime,220 as long as the officers had
probable cause to believe the offense was committed. Thus, in
the cases involving air fresheners, trailer hitches, and the like,
215
See supra text accompanying notes 45–54; see also Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct.
2056, 2069–70 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“This Court has allowed an officer
to stop you for whatever reason he wants—so long as he can point to a pretextual
justification after the fact.”).
216
Granting this much latitude to police officers in making routine traffic stops
has certainly been criticized. As Professor LaFave lamented in his article on traffic
stops, the Court’s approach allows “prohibited drug stops to be sanitized by calling
them traffic stops.” LaFave, supra note 8, at 1904. Moreover, in the words of
Professor Stephen A. Saltzburg, the approach teaches law enforcement that “it can
escape the Fourth Amendment’s restrictions if it offers phony explanations for
actions.” Stephen Saltzburg, The Supreme Court, Criminal Procedure and Judicial
Integrity, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 133, 134 (2003).
217
Devenpeck v. Alford, 543 U.S. 146, 153–54 (2004); see Strieff, 136 S. Ct. at
2069 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“The officer does not even need to know which law
you might have broken so long as he can later point to any possible infraction—even
one that is minor, unrelated, or ambiguous.”).
218
Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
219
Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 353 (2001). In fact, in the case,
the Court even recognized that the “physical incidents of arrest were merely
gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising
extremely poor judgment.” Id. at 346–47. Nonetheless, the Court concluded that the
larger societal interest in workable Fourth Amendment rules precluded a finding of
a violation of the Fourth Amendment when the police had probable cause for the
arrest. Id. at 347–53.
220
Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008) (“We conclude that warrantless
arrests for crimes committed in the presence of an arresting officer are reasonable
under the Constitution, and that while States are free to regulate such arrests
however they desire, state restrictions do not alter the Fourth Amendment’s
protections.”).
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the only possible basis for the stop was the officer’s asserted
mistake about the substantive law’s requirements. And, where
the basis for the stop is the use of an item in the manner
intended, the most reasonable conclusion is that the officer is
asserting an understanding of the law that is not reasonable and
that is likely a pretext for an investigation of suspected criminal
activity.221 While the Court may have excluded the possibility of
a pretext claim when there is a violation of substantive law in
Whren,222 and Heien now permits police to seize individuals when
the substantive law does not prescribe the activity,223 Heien
should not be read to tolerate ignorance, or worse, on the part of
police officers in complying with the commands of the Fourth
Amendment.
In short, Heien should not be a license for police to avoid
their basic responsibility to ascertain what the law actually is
before seizing persons. Every day we subject ourselves to the
possibility of a traffic stop when we get into our cars.224 Indeed,
the sheer volume of traffic laws—and the de minimis nature of
most of the violations and consequences of violations—ensures
that many, if not all of us, may violate traffic laws on a regular
basis.225 As the Seventh Circuit recently stated, “A suspicion so
broad that would permit the police to stop a substantial portion
of the lawfully driving public . . . is not reasonable.”226

221

See United States v. Sanders, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1274 (D. Nev. 2015); United
States v. Black, 104 F. Supp. 3d 997, 1000 (W.D. Mo. 2015).
222
Whren, 517 U.S. at 815–16.
223
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 540 (2014).
224
As the dissent in Mason v. Commonwealth stated, “Every day, millions are
stopped for one of the myriad of regulations governing our use of public streets. As
soon as you get into your car, even before you turn the ignition key, you have
subjected yourself to intense police scrutiny.” 767 S.E.2d 726, 735 (Va. Ct. App.
2015) (Humphreys, J., dissenting).
225
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Ruling Out the Rule of Law, 60 VAND. L. REV. 1497, 1514
(2007); LaFave, supra note 8, at 1853. As Justice Sotomayor noted in her dissent in
Heien, these stops “can be ‘annoying, frightening, and perhaps humiliating.’ ” Heien,
135 S. Ct. at 543 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (quoting Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 25
(1968)); see Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2069–70 (2016) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting) (“Although many Americans have been stopped for speeding or
jaywalking, few may realize how degrading a stop can be when the officer is looking
for more. . . . As onlookers pass by, the officer may ‘feel with sensitive fingers every
portion of [your] body. A thorough search [may] be made of [your] arms and armpits,
waistline and back, the groin and area about the testicles, and entire surface of the
legs down to the feet.’ ” (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 17, n.13)).
226
United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 2015).
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Professor Forde-Mazrui has argued that unfettered police
discretion is inconsistent with our acceptance of the rule of law
and our rejection of a police state in which law enforcement has
the authority to peremptorily search and seize individuals
without cause.227 Our commitment to the rule of law not only
limits the exercise of police powers to conduct the legislature has
defined as criminal in nature, but also provides the public with
fair warning of the type of conduct that can result in interactions
with the police.228 Moreover, numerous studies have shown that
members of minority groups are disproportionately more likely to
be stopped by police officers than are white drivers.229 If Heien is
227

Forde-Mazrui, supra note 225, at 1500.
Id. at 1506–07. Moreover, individuals are more likely to attempt to obey the
law and accept the consequences of failure to obey the law when they perceive the
police as exercising their authority fairly and legitimately. See Stephen J. Schulhofer
et al., American Policing at a Crossroads: Unsustainable Policies and the Procedural
Justice Alternative, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 335, 344–45 (2011) (explaining
that empirical research demonstrates that when individuals perceive authorities as
acting fairly, they will accept that the actions were legitimate and therefore tailor
their conduct to comply with the law).
229
See Sharon LaFraniere & Andrew W. Lehren, The Disproportionate
Risks of Driving While Black, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 25, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/
2015/10/25/us/racial-disparity-traffic-stops-driving-black.html; Kevin R. Johnson,
How Racial Profiling in America Became the Law of the Land: United States v.
Brignoni-Ponce and Whren v. United States and the Need for Truly Rebellious
Lawyering, 98 GEO. L.J. 1005, 1047 (2010); Forde-Mazrui, supra note 225, at 1511–
15; R. Richard Banks, Beyond Profiling: Race, Policing, and the Drug War, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 571, 575–76 (2003) (citing studies of the incidence of racial profiling by law
enforcement); I. Bennett Capers, Policing, Race, and Place, 44 HARV. C.R-C.L. L.
REV. 43, 60–61 (2009) (providing examples of black individuals being stopped
repeatedly when in predominantly white neighborhoods). As Professor Capers
pointed out, although the Terry decision permitted police to proactively prevent
crime, in most cases, the police’s suspicions are disproven. Id. at 62–63. Moreover,
Terry stops—at least in New York City, which keeps statistics on these stops—
disproportionately affect those who are black or Hispanic. Id. at 63. In fact, in
January 2014, New York City settled a class action lawsuit filed in January 2008
challenging the stop and frisk policies and practices of the police department on the
grounds that the police were engaged in unconstitutional racial profiling in carrying
out the policies. Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City
Will Settle Suits on Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html. In 2012,
a federal district court ruled that the tactics of the New York Police Department
were unconstitutional. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 667 (S.D.N.Y.
2013). The injunction the court ordered, however, was stayed by the Second Circuit,
and the appellate court ordered that the case be assigned to a different district court
judge for further proceedings. Ligon v. City of New York, 736 F.3d 118, 129 (2d Cir.
2013). This decision in turn was partially vacated at the request of the City to allow
remand to explore a settlement. Ligon v. City of New York, 743 F.3d 362, 365 (2d
Cir. 2014).
228
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read as permitting police conduct based on purported ambiguities
in the statute without an examination of the reasonableness of
that asserted ambiguity, the decision threatens to exacerbate
this problem.230 Thus, limiting Heien to the “exceedingly rare
case” where a statute is “genuinely ambiguous” is not only
necessary to prevent the “sloppy study of law,” it is necessary to
discourage the abuse of law enforcement powers.231
At a
minimum, courts should respect the general rule that the
government bears the burden of justifying any warrantless
search by proving that the statute is genuinely ambiguous. In
short, the government should be required to show that, in the
words of the government advocate during the Heien oral

230
As Justice Sotomayor pointed out in her Heien dissent, the Supreme Court’s
approach threatens to “significantly expand” the authority that the police already
have in stopping individuals. Heien v. North Carolina 135 S. Ct. 530, 543 (2014)
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
231
Of course, as Professor Harmon points out, there are limits to the regulation
of police behavior through constitutional litigation. First, the exclusionary rule sets
a floor on police behavior; that is, it says what police may not do, rather than what
police should do. Harmon, supra note 60, at 776–78. Thus, even constitutionally
permissible activity, such as a lawful stop, may result in substantial and perhaps
undesirable harm to an individual. Id. at 778. In Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, the
Court acknowledged as much. 532 U.S. 318, 346–47 (2001). In that case, the police
officer arrested a mother in front of her children for failure to wear a seatbelt, and
the Court acknowledged that “the physical incidents of arrest were merely
gratuitous humiliations imposed by a police officer who was (at best) exercising
extremely poor judgment.” Id. at 346–47. Nonetheless, the Court rejected her claim
that the arrest was unreasonable because of the larger societal interests in having
“readily administrable rules.” Id. at 347. Second, the Court renders its decisions, as
Professor Harmon also points out, with at best limited empirical data on the actual
effects of the rulings on police behavior. Harmon, supra note 60, at 772–76.
Consequently, the Court makes normative judgments without an understanding of
the context of the issues or the consequences of the decisions. Id. Indeed, one can see
this in the Atwater Court’s rejection of the claim that a decision in favor of law
enforcement in that case could result in increased police activity—and potential
abuse—because such a claim was as simply “speculative.” Atwater, 532 U.S. at 353
n.25 (“Noticeably absent from the parade of horribles is any indication that the
‘potential for abuse’ has ever ripened into a reality.”). However, as Professor LaFave
pointed out, once the police began using the traffic code as part of the war on drugs,
police began making stops for insignificant traffic violations that were routinely
upheld by the Court. LaFave, supra note 8, at 1847. Thus, it is difficult to have a
great deal of confidence in the Atwater Court’s assertion that “just as surely the
country is not confronting anything like an epidemic of unnecessary minor-offense
arrests.” 532 U.S. at 353. Thus, while Professor Harmon is correct in pointing out
the limits of constitutional remedies in controlling police behavior, that is a reason
to explore other means of addressing the appropriate regulation of police activity—
as she suggests in her article—and not a reason to remove the floor of the
Constitution.
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argument, “a reasonable lawyer would think that the policeman
was right on the law.”232 And, where that is not true, the officer’s
conduct should be found to be unreasonable and in violation of
the commands of the Fourth Amendment.
B.

Unreasonable Mistakes of Law and the Good Faith Exception

Not only does the Heien decision fail to give the lower courts
significant guidance on what is a “reasonable mistake of law” for
purposes of evaluating the substance of a Fourth Amendment
claim, but the distinction the majority opinion and the
concurrence drew between “reasonable mistakes of law” for
purposes of the Fourth Amendment and mistakes tolerated by
the qualified immunity doctrines leads one to question what the
relationship is between reasonable mistakes of law and the good
faith exception. As noted above, eight members of the Court
accepted the proposition that a mistake could be unreasonable
for purposes of a Fourth Amendment claim without being
unreasonable for purposes of a qualified immunity defense.233
And as was discussed earlier,234 there is an overlap with respect
to qualified immunity and the good faith exception. Yet, the
Heien decision is silent on the question of whether the good faith
exception should be available to the government if there is an
unreasonable mistake of law for purposes of the Fourth
Amendment.
The failure of the Court to address the relationship between
its decision and the good faith exception is particularly confusing
in light of the arguments put forth in the case. The Petitioner
argued, as did Justice Sotomayor’s dissent, that mistakes of law
should be considered within the context of the good faith
exception rather than in the context of whether there is a
232
Transcript of Oral Argument at 48, Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 350
(2014) (No. 13-604). Of course, it is possible that this approach could also encourage
the legislature to deliberately write more ambiguous laws so as to allow the police
and prosecutors to argue that the mistake was a reasonable one or that at a
minimum, it was not so unreasonable as to require suppression. Professor Logan
made a similar argument in his article, suggesting that allowing mistakes of law to
satisfy the reasonable suspicion or probable cause standards would encourage
textual imprecision. Logan, supra note 163, at 101. However, this is a consequence
the Court has apparently accepted with its Heien decision. Moreover, the legislature
remains incentivized—at least in theory—to write its laws with some precision to
avoid vagueness challenges.
233
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539; id. at 540–42 (Kagan, J., concurring).
234
See supra note 153 and accompanying text.
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violation of the Fourth Amendment.235 The majority opinion
responded to this argument in two ways. First, it excluded
mistakes regarding the reach of the Fourth Amendment from the
types of mistakes that can be consistent with the Fourth
Amendment.236 Second, the Court explained that in prior cases
dealing with mistakes of law, the Court had looked to the good
faith exception because in those cases the Court had either found
or assumed a Fourth Amendment violation.237 In contrast, the
Court explained that in Heien it was confronting the “antecedent
question” of whether there was a violation of the Fourth
Amendment.238 And yet, despite the heavy presence of the good
faith exception in the arguments before the Court, two
paragraphs later, the Court drew a distinction between
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment and the inquiry
under the qualified immunity standard with no mention of where
the good faith exception would fit into the new understanding of
the role of mistakes of law.239
Although Heien has been interpreted by many courts to
expand the tolerance for police error under the Fourth
Amendment, the failure of the Supreme Court to address the
relationship between a Fourth Amendment claim and the good
faith relationship may paradoxically provide an opportunity to
reconsider the reach of the good faith exception. In every case
between December 2014 and December 2015 in which the courts
have concluded that the stop violated the Fourth Amendment
because the mistake of law was an unreasonable one, the courts
have suppressed the evidence without considering the good faith
exception.240 In fact, of the almost 150 cases that cite Heien

235

Brief for Petitioner-Appellant at 23–34, Heien, 135 S. Ct. 350 (No. 13-604);
Transcript of Oral Argument at 22–25, Heien, 135 S. Ct. 350 (No. 13-604); Heien, 135
S. Ct. at 545 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
236
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539 (majority opinion). The concurrence made this same
point. Id. at 541 n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring).
237
Id. at 539 (majority opinion).
238
Id.
239
Id. at 539–40.
240
See, e.g., United States v. Flores, 798 F.3d 645 (7th Cir. 2015); United States
v. Alvarado-Zarza, 782 F.3d 246 (5th Cir. 2015); United States v. Black, 104 F. Supp.
3d 997 (W.D. Mo. 2015); United States v. Sanders, 95 F. Supp. 3d 1274 (D. Nev.
2015); Darringer v. State, 46 N.E.3d 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015); State v. Nelson, 356
P.3d 1113 (Okla. Crim. App. 2015); State v. Brown, No. 13-2054, 2015 WL 4468841
(Iowa Ct. App. July 22, 2015); People v. Jones, B255728, 2015 WL 1873269 (Cal. Ct.
App. Apr. 23, 2015).
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during this time period, only three state courts have
acknowledged a good faith exception argument by the
government.241 In addition, a review of the briefs filed in federal
court shows that the government has not even argued the good
faith exception in these cases. Instead, the government focuses
on whether the police officer’s stop of the individual was
authorized by the substantive state law, and if not, whether the
police officer’s asserted understanding of the law was “objectively
reasonable” for purposes of the substantive Fourth Amendment
claim.242
The failure of the government to argue the good faith
exception in these cases is a bit surprising given the fact that
before Heien, the government did raise the good faith exception
to excuse mistaken readings of statutory proscriptions.243 The
simple answer appears to be that once the determination is made
that the officer’s mistake of law was unreasonable, then the good
faith exception is not—and should not be—available to the
government. That is, a failure on the part of a law enforcement
agent to understand the scope of a legal prohibition is the type of
culpable conduct that justifies the invocation of the exclusionary
rule. Such an approach respects basic principles of separation of
powers by ensuring that the legislative and executive branches
perform the functions assigned to them.244 Moreover, it is

241
In State v. Tercero, the court concluded that the police officer’s reading of a
statute was unreasonable, and it rejected the government’s attempt to use the good
faith exception because Texas has a more restrictive good faith exception than the
federal good faith exception. 467 S.W.3d 1, 10 (Ct. App. Tex. 2015). In State v. Miller,
the court did not reach the good faith argument because it concluded the mistake
was a reasonable one under the Fourth Amendment. No. 9-14-50, 2015 WL 5095890,
at *2 (Ct. App. Ohio Aug. 31, 2015). Finally, in the one case to reach the merits of
the good faith exception argument, State v. Heilman, the Oregon appellate court
concluded that the trial court erred in finding the exception available when there is
an unreasonable mistake of law made by the officer. 342 P.3d 1102, 1106 n.5 (Ct.
App. Ore. 2015).
242
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539.
243
See United States v. Chanthasouxat, 342 F.3d 1271, 1279–80 (11th Cir.
2003); United States v. Lopez-Soto, 205 F.3d, 1101, 1106 (9th Cir. 2000); United
States v. Lopez-Valdez, 178 F.3d 282, 289 (5th Cir. 1999). What makes the failure of
the government to raise the good faith exception even more peculiar is that these
cases predated the Roberts Court’s expansive reading of the exclusionary rule in the
Hudson, Herring, and Davis decisions.
244
Logan, supra note 163, at 95–101.
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consistent with the results in most of the good faith exception
cases, if not the expansive language used by the Court in its most
recent opinions on the good faith exception.
As Professor Logan has pointed out, permitting police
officers the leeway to make mistakes about the scope of statutory
proscriptions raises significant separation of powers issues.245
Under separation of powers doctrine, the legislature is assigned
the principal duty of establishing the boundaries of criminal
conduct with the judiciary interpreting the law as appropriate.246
When a police officer relies on an unreasonable reading of these
standards, the courts should not excuse these actions under the
good faith exception simply because the prosecutor is able to
construct some sort of statutory construction argument that is
debatable. Such a result would invite law enfocement to evade
the limits placed on police conduct by the legislature. Where a
statute is genuinely ambiguous, Heien teaches that there is no
Fourth Amendment violation because the police conduct was
reasonable and, therefore, the police action could be deemed
consistent with the will of the legislature.247 But, once the
conclusion is reached that the stop was not based on a reasonable
understanding of the law, and therefore the officer ignored the
limits placed by the legislature on her conduct, the evidence
should be suppressed.
Requiring suppression once a determination is made that the
interpretation of the statute is unreasonable also promotes the
clarification of the reach of the law.248 With the division between
Fourth Amendment claims and a remedy in terms of either the
exclusion of evidence or liability under § 1983, courts may reject
the request for relief on remedial grounds without reaching the
Fourth Amendment question. This approach can result in a
failure to develop the substantive Fourth Amendment law
245

Id. at 95.
Id. Assigning this role to the legislature is consistent with the void for
vagueness doctrine. A statute violates due process when it is “so vague that it fails to
give ordinary people fair notice of the conduct it punishes, or so standardless that it
invites arbitrary enforcement.” Johnson v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 2551, 2556
(2015); see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 18–19 (2010); United
States v. Williams, 553 U.S. 285, 304 (2008).
247
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539–40 (2014). As Professor Logan
persuasively argues, permitting police to point to ambiguities in the law may have
the unintended consequence of excusing sloppy drafting by the legislative branch.
Logan, supra note 163, at 95–97.
248
Id. at 98.
246
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because the courts can decline to address how the statute should
be read by instead ruling that the reading was a “reasonable”
one.249 By equating the “objective reasonableness” standard for
both the Fourth Amendment claim and for the good faith
exception when the issue is the interpretation of a statute, the
courts will be required to issue a clarification on the meaning of
the statute, and thereby provide law enforcement with adequate
guidance in the future, rather than leaving the scope of the
statutory proscription unanswered.250
Equating the two standards is also consistent with the
Court’s focus on deterrence as the “sole purpose” of the
exclusionary rule.251 The Court’s approach of assuming that the
exclusionary rule works solely to deter individual officers from
violating the commands of the Fourth Amendment has been
amply criticized.252 But, accepting the deterrence rationale at
face value, there should be no good faith exception when a police
officer’s action is not based on an objectively reasonable
understanding of the scope of statutory proscriptions. Indeed, a
corollary to the deterrence rationale is that where evidence is
suppressed, the police officers involved will alter their conduct to
ensure that evidence seized in the future will not be similarly
suppressed. Thus, under the assumption that “sloppy” studies of
the law are to be discouraged,253 the evidence should be
suppressed when the police officer acts pursuant to an
unreasonable understanding of the law.
Moreover, while the Court’s focus on deterrence at the
individual level is difficult to justify, there is support for the
notion that the extension of the exclusionary rule to the states
helped to play a role in the increased professionalism of the
249
See Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 544 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“This result is bad
for citizens, who need to know their rights and responsibilities, and it is bad for
police, who would benefit from clearer direction.”).
250
Moreover, as Professor Kerr has persuasively written, the existence of a
remedy in terms of exclusion of evidence encourages defendants to raise challenges
to law enforcement actions. Orin S. Kerr, supra note 153, at 1088.
251
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 236–37 (2011); see also Herring v.
United States, 555 U.S. 135, 141–42 (2009).
252
Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment’s Exclusionary Rule as a
Constitutional Right, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L., 357, 357 (2013); David Gray, A
Spectacular Non Sequitur: The Supreme Court’s Contemporary Fourth Amendment
Exclusionary Rule Jurisprudence, 50 AMER. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 9–13 (2013); Kinports,
Culpability, supra note 130, at 835–43.
253
Heien, 135 S. Ct. at 539–40 (majority opinion).
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police by creating institutional incentives for better training for
police officers.254 Requiring evidence to be suppressed when the
police do not have an objectively reasonable understanding of the
law should encourage police departments to provide adequate
training and updates to police officers on the reach of the
substantive law.255 And because adequate training on the reach
of the law helps to guard against police overreaching—and
potentially arbitrary police actions—the use of the exclusionary
rule in this context, in the words of Herring and Davis, “pay[s] its
way.”256
The determination that the good faith exception is not
available when there is an unreasonable mistake of law also
appears to be consistent, or at least reconcilable, with the general
approach to the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule.
Despite the broad language the Court used in both Herring and
Davis regarding the limits to the exclusionary rule,257 the good
faith exception remains, at least in name, an exception to the
general rule that evidence seized in violation of the Fourth
Amendment should be suppressed.258 Further, in each case, but
for Hudson, the Court deemed mistaken judgment of the police
officers “objectively reasonable.”259 For example, in Leon, the
officers applied for a warrant as required by the Fourth
Amendment, and they had no indication that the warrant was
invalid.260 Similarly, in Krull, there was no indication that the

254
Gray, supra note 252, at 27 (noting “[t]he real target for deterrence is not the
individual officer, but law enforcement agencies of which they are a part” and that
“the exclusionary rule creates strong incentives for those agencies to train police
officers”); Kinports, Culpability, supra note 130, at 833 (same); Logan, supra note
163, at 103–05 (discussing the importance of training of police officers).
255
See Darringer v. State, 46 N.E.3d 464 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (holding the police
officer’s mistake of law unreasonable where legislature had amended the law a year
before the stop and police officer’s understanding did not include the change made
by the legislature).
256
Herring, 555 U.S. at 147–48; Davis, 564 U.S. at 238.
257
See supra text accompanying notes 130–42.
258
It should be noted that, taking the Strieff decision together with the good
faith exception decisions, there is a reasonable argument that the exclusion of
evidence, rather than the suppression of evidence, is in fact the exception. Whether
Strieff portends a more significant expansion of exceptions to the exclusionary rule,
however, is the subject of another article.
259
Kinports, Culpability, supra note 130, at 825–26.
260
Unites States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916–17 (1984). As Professors Kamin and
Marceau, among others, have noted, Leon’s recognition of the good faith exception
when the police obtain a warrant can be understood as consistent with the Fourth
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statute the officers were relying on was invalid.261 In both Evans
and Herring, there was also no reason for the police officers who
were stopping the individuals to know that the basis for the stop
was factually erroneous. Admittedly, in Evans, the mistaken
information was transmitted to a police officer from a judicial
officer,262 whereas in Herring, the erroneous information came
from someone in another police department.263 Yet, in both cases,
the Court viewed the police officers as following the correct
procedures under the Fourth Amendment, and, hence, the Court
was unwilling to exclude the evidence.264 And, finally, in Davis,
the officers’ actions were consistent with binding precedent in the
jurisdiction.265
Hudson is the only case in which it could be concluded that
the police who conducted the stop or search had reason to know
their conduct was not in accordance with governing law under
the Fourth Amendment. In Hudson, it was clearly established
that police were required to knock and announce before executing
a search warrant and the police officers failed to adhere to this
rule.266 The Court, however, broke the chain between the
illegality of the police conduct and the evidence seized by the
police by determining that the violation “was not a but-for cause
of obtaining the evidence.”267 And, while Hudson’s comments
about the good faith exception were picked up by the Court in
Herring and in Davis, the degree of police culpability in fact was
irrelevant to Hudson’s holding. Hudson created a bright-line
rule that evidence seized in violation of the knock-and-announce
requirement was never to be suppressed, regardless of the
culpability of the officers.268
Amendment’s general preference for warrants. Kamin and Marceau, supra note 14,
at 614.
261
Illinois v. Krull, 480 U.S. 340, 350 (1987).
262
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1 (1995).
263
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 138 (2009).
264
Evans, 514 U.S. at 15–16 (“There is no indication that the arresting officer
was not acting objectively reasonably when he relied upon the police computer
record.”); Herring, 555 U.S. at 140 (explaining “[t]he Coffee County officers did
nothing improper”).
265
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 241 (2011) (explaining that “when
binding appellate precedent specifically authorizes a particular police practice, welltrained officers will and should use that tool to fulfill their crime-detection and
public-safety responsibilities”).
266
Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 590 (2006).
267
Id. at 592.
268
Kinports, Culpability, supra note 130, at 829.
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In short, once there is an unreasonable understanding of the
substantive law, the good faith exception should not permit the
government to introduce the evidence discovered through the
unlawful conduct.
That is, an objectively unreasonable
understanding of the substantive law renders the officer culpable
for purposes of the good faith exception. Thus, the fact that the
lower courts who have determined that the mistake of law was
unreasonable post-Heien were correct in not exploring the good
faith exception. But, if this understanding of the relationship
between the requirements of the Fourth Amendment and the
good faith exception is correct, the understanding casts some
doubt on the relationship between the good faith exception and
the doctrine of qualified immunity. Recall that eight members of
the Court drew a distinction between mistakes that are
“objectively reasonable” for purposes of a Fourth Amendment
claim and “objectively reasonable” mistakes for purposes of an
officer’s qualified immunity claim. If the first premise of this
paragraph is correct—that a mistake of law that is not
objectively reasonable under the Fourth Amendment is also not
objectively reasonable for purposes of the good faith exception—
and if we accept Heien’s conclusion that a mistake of law can be
unreasonable for a Fourth Amendment claim but reasonable for
purposes of a qualified immunity claim, then the question arises
as to whether there is a distinction between what is an
“objectively reasonable” mistake for purposes of the good faith
exception and what is “objectively reasonable” for purposes of
qualified immunity. And, that question in turn may suggest
rethinking the reach of the good faith exception.
III. A RETHINKING OF THE GOOD FAITH EXCEPTION
It may be possible that Heien could provide a vehicle to
reconsider the expansive language of the most recent good faith
exception cases and limit the reach of the exception when a police
officer misapprehends the reach of the Fourth Amendment.269
269
The attempt in this Article to limit the reach of the good faith exception may
have been made more difficult by a decision released after this Article was written,
Utah v. Strieff, 136 S. Ct. 2056 (2016), in which the Court arguably increased its
tolerance for constitutional violations by incorporating some of the culpability
concerns of the good faith exception into the attenuation doctrine. In Strieff, the
Court concluded that the attenuation doctrine can apply when the officer
unconstitutionally stopped an individual and in the stop discovered that the suspect
had an outstanding warrant which in turn led to an arrest and search that produced
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Both the majority and concurring Heien opinions distinguished
mistakes as to the scope of the statutory proscription from
mistakes as to the scope of the Fourth Amendment itself.270 This
distinction means that a police officer can misapprehend the
scope of a traffic regulation and have the stop conform to the
Fourth Amendment, but if the officer misapprehends the
commands of the Fourth Amendment itself, then there is a
violation of the Constitution. In addition, the majority and
concurring opinions distinguish between mistakes for purposes of
a Fourth Amendment claim and mistakes that are unreasonable
for purposes of qualified immunity.271 These two distinctions
leave one to wonder where the good faith exception fits into the
continuum between a substantive Fourth Amendment claim and
a qualified immunity claim.
There seem to be three choices. The first choice is to read
the good faith standard as the same standard used in the
qualified immunity context. But, as was discussed in the
preceding section, this conclusion is contrary to the approach the
lower courts have taken and would encourage the “sloppy study
of law” that the Heien Court seemed to be concerned about. The
other alternatives are to reconceive the good faith exception as
part of the substance of the Fourth Amendment or to limit the
applicability of the good faith exception. It is to those latter two
alternatives to which this Article now turns.
Applying the logic of Heien, it is difficult to understand the
distinction being drawn by the Court between a mistake
regarding the contours of the Fourth Amendment and a mistake
regarding the meaning of a statutory prohibition. After all, the
Court has made clear that “reasonableness” is the “ultimate
drugs on the arrestee. Id. at 2064. As part of the Court’s analysis, the Court
concluded that the evidence was admissible because the initial stop was not a
“purposeful or flagrant violation” of the Constitution. Id. at 2063. The relationship
between the good faith exception and the attenuation doctrine, as well as the Court’s
willingness to accept police errors, remains in a state of flux, particularly because
Justice Breyer, who authored dissents in Hudson, Herring, and Davis, joined the
majority in Strieff.
270
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014) (“An officer’s mistaken
view that the conduct at issue did not give rise to [a Fourth Amendment] violation—
no matter how reasonable—could not change that ultimate conclusion.”); id. at 541
n.1 (Kagan, J., concurring) (asserting that “one kind of mistaken legal judgment—an
error about the contours of the Fourth Amendment itself—can never support a
search or seizure”).
271
Id. at 540–41.
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touchstone” for substantive Fourth Amendment claims. Just as
an officer may make a mistake as to the facts or as to the scope of
a legal prohibition, an officer could have a reasonable, yet
erroneous view of the requirements of the Fourth Amendment.
The majority in Heien’s reasoning was that because reasonable
officers can make mistakes of law as well as mistakes of fact, the
requirements of the Fourth Amendment can be met when
mistakes of either kind are made as long as those mistakes are
reasonable ones.272 It is not clear why this same logic does not
apply to the requirements of the Fourth Amendment itself.
Rather, as Richard Re suggested in his recent article, it could
make more sense to consider reasonable mistakes in determining
whether there was a Fourth Amendment violation as opposed to
considering the mistakes within the context of an exception to
the exclusionary rule.273
Under Re’s view, the good faith
exception is a misnomer, and the cases decided as good faith
exceptions should be better explained as concluding that the
challenged conduct was reasonable, and hence there was no
Fourth Amendment violation.274 And, with Heien’s recognition
that mistakes of law still render a search consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, Re’s approach is appealing.275
In the good faith cases, the Court has largely faced situations
in which the law enforcement officer’s actions could be deemed
reasonable based on the information before the officers had at the
time.276 Whether the officer relied on a facially valid warrant,277
information provided by a third party,278 or available case law,279
the Court asked whether the officer is “ ‘act[ing] as a reasonable
officer would and should act’ under the circumstances.”280 And
yet, that is precisely what the Court is asking the lower courts to
272

Id. at 536 (majority opinion).
Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885,
1942–44 (2014).
274
Id.
275
It is also appealing because Re suggests grounding the exclusionary rule in
the due process clause as opposed to the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1912–18. This
suggestion would provide a constitutional basis for the exclusionary rule, rather
than simply viewing the exclusionary rule as a judicially created remedy.
276
That is, leaving aside Hudson. See supra text accompanying notes 262–68.
277
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 900 (1984).
278
Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 16 (1995); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S.
135, 147 (2009).
279
Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 240 (2011).
280
Id. at 241 (quoting Leon, 468 U.S. at 920).
273
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decide in the Fourth Amendment mistake cases.281 Moreover, the
good faith cases overlap with the mistake cases. For example, in
Michigan v. DeFillippo,282 the Court found that an arrest based
on a subsequently invalidated statute was nonetheless supported
by probable cause, whereas in Illinois v. Krull,283 the Court used
the good faith exception to allow the government to use evidence
obtained when officers relied on a statute later invalidated. It is
difficult to discern why the different doctrines were used in these
two cases—beyond the obvious point that the advocates relied on
different doctrines. Similarly, whereas in Rodriguez the Court
asked whether the police mistake—that someone had the
authority to consent to a search—was reasonable and therefore
there was no violation of the Fourth Amendment,284 in Herring
the Court considered whether the police mistake—thinking there
was an outstanding warrant—could be excused under the good
faith exception.285 In fact, even the Supreme Court in Herring
recognized that the standard of probable cause allows for error,
and, thus, it was possible to conclude in that case that there was
no Fourth Amendment violation to begin with.286
The problem with treating all good faith cases as substantive
Fourth Amendment cases, however, is that this approach fails to
adequately account for the fact that a majority of the Court views
the exclusionary rule with significant distaste.287 In good faith
exception cases, the Court has expressed culpability concerns
that go beyond looking at whether the conduct is reasonable and
instead asks whether the conduct was “deliberate, reckless, or
grossly negligent.”288 As a result, a possible consequence of
adopting the view that the good faith exception cases should
really be viewed as reasonableness cases under the Fourth
Amendment is that the Court could incorporate the culpability
concerns of the good faith exception into the substance of the
Fourth Amendment itself. And incorporating the culpability

281
Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 539 (2014); Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497
U.S. 177, 188 (1990).
282
443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979).
283
480 U.S. 340, 359–60 (1987).
284
Rodriguez, 497 U.S. at 188.
285
Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147 (2009).
286
Id. at 139.
287
This distaste was reiterated in the Strieff decision rendered this term. See
supra note 144 and accompanying text.
288
Herring, 555 U.S. at 144.
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language of Herring and Davis into the Fourth Amendment itself
could result in a significant constriction of the protections offered
by the Fourth Amendment.289 If the Court were to import its
culpability requirements from the recent good faith cases into its
understanding of what is “objectively reasonable” for purposes of
a Fourth Amendment claim, the amount of protections offered by
the Fourth Amendment would surely shrink. Moreover, such an
approach would ignore the substantial divide between Fourth
Amendment rights and remedies that the Court has adhered to
since Leon, which has arguably permitted the Court to continue
to revisit the reach of the Fourth Amendment.290
If the reasonableness for the good faith exception is different
from the reasonableness for substantive Fourth Amendment
claims, and is also different from the qualified immunity
standard, the result is a conundrum as to how to view the
standard of “objective reasonableness” for purposes of the good
faith exception. The good faith exception standard and the
qualified immunity standard are essentially the same when
dealing with a search pursuant to a warrant.291 There is also an
overlap in cases when the officer is acting pursuant to case law
that authorizes the conduct.292 But, perhaps Heien’s distinction
between objectively reasonable mistakes for Fourth Amendment
and qualified immunity purposes means that the good faith
exception is not always available to law enforcement as a possible
argument. Rather, perhaps the exception should be limited to
289
This is true at least if one does not accept Re’s suggestion to reconceptualize
the exclusionary rule as a requirement of the due process clause rather than the
Fourth Amendment. See Re, supra note 273, at 1912. By placing the exclusionary
rule within the due process clause, Re avoids the problems identified in this
paragraph. But, it requires the Court to accept the due process argument.
290
Judge Wilkinson has argued that this dichotomy allows the courts to use the
rhetoric of rights as an aspirational goal, while limiting the impact of that rhetoric
in particular cases. J. Harvey Wilkinson III, The Dual Lives of Rights: The Rhetoric
and Practice of Rights in America, 98 CAL. L. REV. 277, 279–80 (2010). In a different
approach that also acknowledges the divide between rights and remedies, Professors
Kamin and Marceau suggest that one way out of the double reasonableness bind of
the good faith exception is to accept the good faith exception culpability analysis, but
replace the reasonableness test for substantive Fourth Amendment claims with
fixed rules so that there are clear rules to guide law enforcement conduct. Kamin
and Marceau, supra note 14, at 627–31.
291
See Davis, 564 U.S. at 240.
292
Davis makes clear that the good faith exception applies when the officer acts
in accordance with binding precedent. Id. at 241. Similarly, officials are protected
from individual liability when their conduct conforms with precedent, as they are
protected so long as their conduct does not violate clearly established law.
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situations in which the error can be attributed to someone other
than the investigatory officers themselves.
In short, the
convergence between the good faith exception and qualified
immunity standard should be understood to be a limited one.
Under this understanding, when the police officers
themselves acted under an erroneous understanding of the
Fourth Amendment—unsupported by precedent or judicial
authorization—the good faith exception would not be available to
allow the use of the evidence against the defendant, even if the
officer would not be held liable under qualified immunity.
Adopting this approach could resolve a current circuit split over
whether the good faith exception is available when police violate
the Fourth Amendment and use illegally obtained information to
obtain a warrant.293 Both the Sixth and Eighth Circuits have
extended the good faith exception to situations in which the
initial conduct by the officers was a reasonable mistake in the
reading of the Fourth Amendment.294 Other circuits rightly
Permitting the government to argue that the
disagree.295
investigating officers made a “reasonable mistake” under the
Fourth Amendment undermines the Heien Court’s determination
to exclude the reach of the Fourth Amendment from the
“reasonable mistakes” that can be consistent with the demands of
the Fourth Amendment.
Limiting the reach of the good faith exception, as this Article
suggests, would honor the Court’s recognition that searches and
seizures conducted without a warrant are “per se unreasonable”
unless they fall within “specifically established and welldelineated exceptions.”296 It would also acknowledge the reality
that without the exclusionary rule, there may be no effective
remedy for a Fourth Amendment violation, and, hence, little
incentive for local jurisdictions to provide effective training and

293
See Hadar Aviram et al., Moving Targets: Placing the Good Faith Doctrine in
the Context of Fragmented Policing, 37 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 709, 718 (2010); Andrew
Z. Lipson, Note, The Good Faith Exception as Applied to Illegal Predicate Searches:
A Free Pass to Institutional Ignorance, 80 HASTINGS L.J. 1147, 1147–48 (2009).
294
United States v. Fugate, 499 F. App’x 514, 519 (6th Cir. 2012), cert. denied,
136 S. Ct. 33 (2015); United States v. McClain, 444 F.3d 556, 566 (6th Cir. 2005);
United States v. White, 890 F.2d 1413, 1419 (8th Cir. 1989).
295
United States v. McGough, 412 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir. 2005); United
States v. Wanless, 882 F.2d 1459, 1466–67 (9th Cir. 1989).
296
City of Los Angeles v. Patel, 135 S. Ct. 2443, 2452 (2015).
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oversight of law enforcement personnel.297 Thus, when the
source of the error was not the officer, the good faith exception
would be available to the government. But, where the source of
the error was the officer, the good faith exception would not be
available, even if a court would likely provide the officer with
qualified immunity if the issue arose in a § 1983 action. Or, put
differently, police officers do not engage in “objectively reasonable
law enforcement activity”298 when they violate the Fourth
Amendment by not seeking a warrant or acting in accordance
with established law.
CONCLUSION
The decision in Heien clearly expanded the leeway offered to
police officers under the Fourth Amendment. At the same time,
what purports to be a relatively simple decision with the
agreement of eight justices raises more questions than it
answers. Indeed, a review of the cases decided since Heien shows
that, as Justice Sotomayor’s dissent predicted,299 the “objective
reasonableness” standard that the Court presented as a
relatively simple proposition is anything but simple. The lower
courts are significantly divided as to how to view alleged
mistakes in interpretation, with many offering greater tolerance
for police error than was perhaps envisioned by the Court.
At the same time, Heien paradoxically offers the possibility
of rethinking the good faith exception. While qualified immunity
and the good faith exception share the divorce of rights and
remedies and rhetoric of blameworthiness, Heien’s distinction
between errors for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and errors
297

See Davis, 564 U.S. at 259 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (explaining that “the
exclusionary rule is often the only sanction available for a Fourth Amendment
violation”); Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 153–57 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting)
(2008) (arguing that not only is the exclusionary rule often the only sanction
available, but also that the Court’s approach deprives police departments of
incentives to take precaution to ensure the integrity of the information on their
databases). Indeed, Justice Ginsburg expressly addressed the assertion that the
exclusionary rule was unnecessary given the professionalism of current police
practices: “It has been asserted that police departments have become sufficiently
‘professional’ that they do not need external deterrence to avoid Fourth Amendment
violations. But professionalism is a sign of the exclusionary rule’s efficacy—not of its
superfluity.” Id. at 156 n.6 (citations omitted).
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Davis, 564 U.S. at 241 (majority opinion).
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Heien v. North Carolina, 135 S. Ct. 530, 547 (2014) (Sotomayor, J.,
dissenting).
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for purpose of qualified immunity suggests that the good faith
exception may occupy a different space than the qualified
immunity standard. Thus, while the Court has called for an
evaluation of the culpability of the officer, that evaluation is
appropriate where the police officer has done what could be
reasonably expected—acted in accordance with binding
precedent, applied for a warrant that appeared valid, asked for
information that later turned out to be inaccurate. Where,
however, the police officer acts without a warrant, and outside
what has been authorized by precedent as consistent with the
Fourth Amendment, the evidence cannot come in under the good
faith exception. And, if that is true, the extensive language
employed by the Court in its good faith trilogy may have some
limits.

